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The Immigrant “Other”: Racialized Identity and the 
Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations 
ANITA ORTIZ MADDALI* 
This Article explores how current terminations of undocumented immigrants’ 
parental rights are reminiscent of historical practices that removed early 
immigrant and Native American children from their parents in an attempt to 
cultivate an Anglo-American national identity. Today, children are separated from 
their families when courts terminate the rights of parents who have been, or who 
face, deportation. Often, biases toward undocumented parents affect 
determinations concerning parental fitness in a manner that, while different, reaps 
the same results as the removal of children from their families over a century ago. 
This Article examines cases in which courts terminated the parental rights of 
undocumented parents because of biases about the parents’ immigration status, 
language, race, culture, and the belief that life in the United States is better for 
children than returning with a parent to a poorer country, such as Mexico or 
Guatemala. This Article suggests that these termination decisions are reflective of 
tensions around identity and how to cultivate a preferred American identity. 
Further, this Article explores how using the law to cultivate a preferred identity 
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INTRODUCTION 
Her lifestyle, that of smuggling herself into the country illegally and 
committing crimes in this country, is not a lifestyle that can provide 
stability for a child . . . . A child cannot be educated in this way, always 
in hiding or on the run.1 
The above quote comes from a juvenile court decision that terminated the 
parental rights of Encarnación Maria Bail Romero, an undocumented immigrant 
from Guatemala. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Bail 
Romero in 2007 during a workplace raid of the poultry processing plant in Missouri 
that had employed her.2 She pled guilty to aggravated identity theft and received a 
mandatory two-year sentence.3 Her son, Carlos, was seven months old at the time.4 
While incarcerated, a local couple offered to assist Bail Romero’s relatives who 
had been caring for Carlos.5 Within a few months of this arrangement, this couple, 
without first contacting child welfare services, gave Carlos to another couple that 
was interested in adopting a Latino child.6 Two days later, the second couple 
moved to terminate Bail Romero’s parental rights and adopt Carlos.7 The juvenile 
court eventually terminated Bail Romero’s parental rights and approved the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Ginger Thompson, After Losing Freedom, Some Immigrants Face Loss of Custody 
of Their Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A15 (quoting the presiding judge). The first 
juvenile court decision remains sealed, but a copy of it was allegedly leaked to the New York 
Times. Therefore, the information about the first decision could only be obtained from this 
New York Times article.  
  I drafted an amicus brief in this case while working as a staff attorney for the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund. 
 2. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 801 (Mo. 2011). 
 3. Id. at 802; see also In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477 at *9 (Mo. Cir. 
Ct. July 18, 2012) (on file with author) (second termination decision, which, unlike the first 
decision, is not sealed). Bail Romero’s conviction preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647 (2009) (requiring proof, for purposes of 
an aggravated identity theft conviction, that an individual knew that a social security number 
or identity card belonged to someone else). 
 4. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 801. 
 5. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *15–16.  
 6. Id. at *21.  
 7. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 802 (noting that Carlos’s first overnight 
visit with the Mosers was on October 3, 2007, and the Mosers filed the petition on October 
5, 2007).  
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adoption.8 Bail Romero appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which reversed 
the termination and adoption but remanded the case for a new trial before the 
juvenile court.9 In July 2012 the juvenile court once again terminated Bail 
Romero’s parental rights and approved the adoption,10 and in October 2013 the 
Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s decision.11 
Undocumented12 parents—like Bail Romero—are losing their parental rights.13 
Cases involving improper terminations of undocumented parents’ parental rights 
that are appealed are often reversed.14 While this is reassuring, the problem is that 
most undocumented parents do not have the resources to appeal, especially when 
the parent has already been deported. Even when the problem is corrected, families 
face prolonged separations, and if the child is later returned to the parent, the child 
must deal with a second separation from his or her adoptive or foster parents. 
Moreover, tracking these cases is difficult because juvenile court records are 
frequently sealed, and there often is no published opinion.  
The federal government deported 46,000 parents of U.S.-citizen children in the 
first six months of 2011.15 To determine how these deportations have affected 
parents and their children, the Applied Research Center (ARC) conducted a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Id. at 804. 
 9. See id. at 823–24. 
 10. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *62.  
 11. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.), No. SD32228 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 
2013). 
 12. I use the term “undocumented” throughout this Article to describe both those who 
entered surreptitiously and those who overstayed a visa. For a more detailed discussion about 
terms such as “illegal alien,” “unauthorized,” and “undocumented,” see STEPHEN H. 
LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1140–
41 (5th ed. 2009). 
 13. This problem likely not only affects undocumented parents. Because all 
noncitizens—lawful permanent residents and those on a temporary immigrant status, for 
instance—can be subject to deportation, all noncitizen families may be at risk of separation. 
As of July 2012, 1.4 million immigrants had been deported. Under President Obama’s 
administration, 1.5 times more immigrants have been deported compared with the number of 
deportations under former President Bush’s administration. Suzy Khimm, Obama Is 
Deporting Immigrants Faster Than Bush. Republicans Don’t Think That’s Enough, 
WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Aug. 27, 2012, 2:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2012/08/27/obama-is-deporting-more-immigrants-than-bush-republicans-
dont-think-thats-enough/; see also Helen O’Neill, U.S.-Born Kids of Deported Parents 
Struggle as Family Life Is ‘Destroyed,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2012, 3:26 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/25/us-born-kids-deported-parents_n_1830496
.html?. 
 14. See, e.g., In re Interest of M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832–33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re 
Interest of V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 490 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); In re Termination of the Parental 
Rights of Doe, 281 P.3d 95, 95–96 (Idaho 2012); In re B., 756 N.W.2d 234, 237, 242 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2008); State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 74–75 
(Neb. 2009); State v. Mercedes S. (In re Interest of Mainor T.), 674 N.W.2d 442, 449, 464 
(Neb. 2004); In re Interest of E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 796 (Tex. 2012). 
 15. SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE 
PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 5 
(2011). 
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qualitative study on family separations involving undocumented parents in six 
states. In six other states, ARC relied upon media and advocacy reports to confirm 
the prevalence of these cases. Additionally, it interviewed attorneys, caseworkers, 
and officials from foreign consulates in ten other states. ARC’s research confirmed 
that parents in detention or facing deportation risk permanent separation from their 
children.16 It conservatively estimates that there are 5100 children in foster care in 
the United States who have parents who were detained or deported and that should 
the rate of these types of separations continue, in the next five years there will 
likely be at least 15,000 children who might not be able to reunify with their 
parents.17 
This Article explores how current terminations of undocumented immigrants’ 
parental rights are reminiscent of historical practices that removed early immigrant 
and Native American children from their parents in an attempt to cultivate an 
Anglo-American national identity. Today, children are separated from their 
families when courts terminate the rights of parents who have been, or who face, 
deportation. Often, biases toward undocumented parents affect determinations of 
parental fitness in a manner that, while different, reaps the same results as the 
removal of children from their families over a century ago. This Article examines 
cases in which courts terminated the parental rights of undocumented parents 
because of biases about the parents’ immigration status, language, race, culture, and 
the belief that life in the United States is better for children than returning with a 
parent to a poorer country, such as Mexico or Guatemala. This Article suggests that 
these termination decisions are reflective of tensions around identity and how to 
cultivate a preferred American identity.18 Further, this Article explores how using 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. Id. at 22–25. For other publications documenting this problem, see UNIV. OF ARIZ., 
DISAPPEARING PARENTS: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD 
WELFARE SYSTEM 2 (2011), http://sirow.arizona.edu/sites/sirow.arizona.edu/files
/disappearing_parents_report_final.pdf (indicating that through its research, attorneys, 
judges, and caseworkers all reported experience with cases involving parents in immigration 
detention or deportation proceedings); Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration 
Enforcement and the Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 114–18 (2011) (noting 
that because the child welfare system and ICE do not collect this information, it is difficult to 
determine the number of families affected). Rabin does state that the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General reported that from 1998 to 2007, 108,434 
parents of U.S.-citizen children were deported. Id. at 114. Additionally, she conducted 
surveys and interviews of personnel in the Pima County Juvenile System to determine the 
frequency with which children are involved with the child welfare system as a result of a 
parent’s deportation. Id. at 115. Based on the information she gathered, Rabin concluded that 
“the numbers of such cases in the system suggest that immigration status arises frequently 
enough for it to be an issue about which personnel in the child welfare system are aware, but 
not so frequently that they are accustomed to dealing with such cases in a prescribed, 
uniform manner.” Id. at 118. 
 17. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 6. 
 18.  Sociologists have defined identities as “linguistic labels, indexes of the self that 
individuals simultaneously claim and have imputed to them based on items, such as 
residence, group membership, shared social experience, and place identification.” Linda M. 
Burton, Raymond Garrett-Peters & John Major Eason, Morality, Identity, and Mental Health 
in Rural Ghettos, in COMMUNITIES, NEIGHBORHOODS, AND HEALTH: EXPANDING THE 
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the law to cultivate a preferred identity can subvert the constitutional rights of 
undocumented parents and undermine their family relationships. 
Both immigration and family law “broker boundaries”19 around belonging and 
identity. Immigration law sets the parameters around who may enter the 
United States and who may remain in the country. Historically, immigration and 
citizenship law have used race—however constructed at a particular time—to 
determine these parameters. Likewise, economic and political conditions within the 
United States have also influenced how immigrant groups are perceived and 
treated.20 Immigrants whose culture and values more closely aligned with 
Anglo-Protestants of Northern European heritage have historically been favored 
under immigration law and have integrated more easily into American society.21  
As sociologists Douglas Massey and Magaly Sánchez describe, when natives 
view a particular immigrant group with hostility, this can make assimilation and 
integration much more difficult for the immigrant.22 Irish, Chinese, Japanese, 
Italians, Poles, and Eastern European Jews were all viewed as a threat to American 
society at one point, making the process of assimilation more difficult for members 
of these groups.23 “[A]ssimilation is about the restructuring of group identities and 
the redefinition of social boundaries so that immigrants and their descendants are 
perceived and treated by natives as ‘us’ rather than ‘them.’”24 It is a process, and a 
                                                                                                                 
BOUNDARIES OF PLACE 91, 101 (Linda M. Burton et al. eds., 2011) (citation omitted). In this 
Article, I explore tensions around group identity—American versus other—where 
differences in language, culture, race, social experience, and place identification become a 
basis for the exclusion, othering, and stigmatization of immigrant newcomers.  
 19. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & MAGALY SÁNCHEZ R., BROKERED BOUNDARIES: CREATING 
IMMIGRANT IDENTITY IN ANTI-IMMIGRANT TIMES 15 (2010) (“Like all human beings, 
immigrants and natives have both group and individual identities, and membership in social 
categories plays a critical role in how people develop a sense of themselves as social beings. 
Whenever two people interact, they engage one another not only as individuals but as 
representatives of the social groups to which they belong. In their interaction, they broker 
intergroup boundaries and through this process of brokering extract meaning to construct and 
modify identity on an ongoing basis.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 20. See id. at 13 (describing one researcher’s observation that immigrants of European 
origin were able to assimilate because of their “whiteness,” the suspension of immigration 
from 1930 to 1970, their strong motivation to advance economically, and, most importantly, 
the New Deal and the economic strength of the country after World War II). 
 21. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 49 (2004) (The impetus for the quota system was 
“the beleaguered feeling of so many old-stock Protestant Americans. Immigrants and their 
non-Protestant cultures, they felt, represented a serious and sustained challenge to American 
values.”); MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 12 (noting the “massive assimilation 
among Euro-Americans by the 1990s” and contrasting it with “segmentation and 
transnationalism” of new immigrant groups); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration 
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” Into the Heart of Darkness, 73 
IND. L.J. 1111, 1130–31 (1998) (“Despite persistent criticisms, including claims that it 
adversely affected U.S. foreign policy interests, the Anglo-Saxon, northern European 
preference in the immigration laws remained intact until 1965.”). 
 22. MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 13–14. 
 23. Id. at 14. 
 24. Id.  
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difficult one for natives and immigrants.25 Yet, according to Massey and Sánchez, 
those who have more resources and power “are prone to undertake boundary work 
to define one or more out-groups and then frame them as lacking basic human 
attributes of warmth and competence, thus justifying their ongoing exploitation and 
exclusion.”26 
Today, there are close to twelve million undocumented immigrants who are 
present in the United States without permission and, thus, who do not belong.27 
Simply stating that they do not belong, however, ignores important nuances. 
Immigration and economic policies and a labor market that has encouraged 
migration from the south have facilitated the growth of the undocumented 
immigrant population. The proliferation of the undocumented population was not 
simply the result of migrants deciding to cross the border unlawfully, but also 
involved complicated economic and political factors, as well as contradictory 
immigration policies, which have simultaneously encouraged and restricted 
migration.28  
As a practical matter, the existence of a large undocumented population means 
that there are approximately twelve million people who are both included and 
excluded within American society.29 They are included in the sense that they are 
actively participating in society—in the workforce, in schools, and in 
communities.30 At the same time, they are excluded.31 They cannot obtain drivers’ 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. There are many theories of assimilation and acculturation that are beyond the scope 
of this Article. Generally, however, it is important to note that the concept of assimilation 
has various meanings. Classical or straight-line assimilation argued that immigrants, after 
arrival, go through three basic stages: acculturation—adopting the language and values of 
the new country; structural assimilation—immigrants and their children develop personal 
networks with natives; and marital assimilation—the descendants of immigrants intermarry 
with natives of the new country. Id. at 2. Contrary to this assimilation theory, in the 1990s 
social scientists began to acknowledge that assimilation was not always such a smooth, 
linear process for immigrant groups. From this research emerged the theory of segmented 
assimilation. Under segmented assimilation an immigrant group’s assimilation may move 
upward or downward depending upon many factors, including, but not limited to, race, 
ethnicity, legal status, level of education, and whether a group speaks English. See id. at 5–6. 
 26. Id. at 14. 
 27. Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrants Number 11.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2012, 
at A14. 
 28. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND 
MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 1–3 (2002).  
 29. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the 
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955 (describing the 
undocumented immigrant as both an insider and outsider). 
 30. “DREAMers”—those who entered the United States before the age of sixteen and 
who have lived in the United States continuously for at least five years—are the perfect 
example of undocumented immigrants who are participating in society (having grown up 
exclusively in the United States) but who are excluded because of their undocumented status. 
Though the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) provides temporary status for 
undocumented youth, it does not create a pathway to lawful permanent status or citizenship. 
For information about Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, see Consideration of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
www.uscis.gov/childhoodarrivals (last updated July 2, 2013). 
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licenses, work without authorization, or access most public benefits. And, of 
course, they cannot join the political community. 
Once here, however, their ties to the United States grow stronger. Most 
noticeably, if an undocumented immigrant has a child that is born in the 
United States, that child automatically becomes a U.S. citizen.32 As of 2008, there 
were 5.5 million children living in the United States with at least one 
undocumented parent.33 Of those children, seventy-three percent were U.S. 
citizens.34 This presents a difficult situation—while U.S.-citizen children who have 
undocumented parents are entitled to certain benefits because of their citizenship 
status, their parents, who make decisions on their behalf, do not have equal status 
and are not entitled to the same benefits.  
The federal government has addressed unlawful migration by securing the 
border,35 increasing deportations,36 and developing harsh immigration laws and 
policies that transform traditionally civil immigration violations into criminal 
offenses.37 Additionally, States have attempted to enforce immigration laws 
through the passage of anti-immigrant legislation, some of which make 
immigration-related offenses criminal.38  
                                                                                                                 
 31. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 2 (2004) (“Marginalized by their position in the lower strata of the 
workforce and even more so by their exclusion from the polity, illegal aliens might be 
understood as a caste, unambiguously situated outside the boundaries of formal membership 
and social legitimacy.”). 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.”). 
 33. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2009), pewhispanic.org/files/reports
/107.pdf. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER PATROL 
AGENT STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (2012), http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border
_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/staffing_1993_2012.ctt/staffing_199
3_2012.pdf (noting that there were over 21,000 agents tasked with securing the border); 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Cluster Introduction—Immigrant Outsider, Alien 
Invader: Immigration Policing Today, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 231, 231–33 (2012) (arguing that 
the reach of immigration policing is motivated by fear and racism). 
 36. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE 
TOTAL REMOVALS (2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ero 
more-removals1.pdf (showing that total removals in 2007 were 291,060, but as of August 
2012 they had already reached 366,292). 
 37. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 371 (2006) (“Deportation became the consequence of almost any 
criminal conviction of a noncitizen, including legal permanent residents. Immigrants who 
had previously been subject only to civil immigration proceedings, including tourists and 
business travelers who had overstayed their visas and students working beyond allotted 
hours or in unauthorized employment, were newly subject to criminal sanctions in addition 
to removal.”). 
 38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-7 to -35 (2011) (various measures ranging from 
access to public benefits to employer verification of immigration status); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1509(A) (Supp. 2012) (criminal sanction for failing to carry documentation 
650 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:643 
 
The increased criminalization of immigrants fosters negative stereotypes about 
them—stereotypes that not only relate to their immigration status but also to their 
personhood.39 For instance, an undocumented immigrant is not simply perceived as 
having violated immigration laws, but is also, as legal scholar David Thronson 
suggests, part of a “societal narrative that constructs an expanding notion of 
unworthiness and ‘illegality.’”40 As expressed by one resident in Tulsa when 
explaining his frustrations with undocumented immigrants, “[y]ou come in 
illegally; everything you do from that point on is illegal.”41 Because Latino 
immigrants constitute about half of the immigrants who have come to the 
United States since 196542 and comprise the largest group of undocumented 
immigrants,43 negative views about undocumented immigrants usually coexist with 
views about Latinos.44  
Tensions around identity also exist in the family law context. Because the family 
is where language, culture, and values are transmitted,45 it is, in essence, where 
                                                                                                                 
demonstrating lawful immigration status), invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-6A-10 (2012) (establishing a grant or incentive 
program to local law enforcement agencies to enter into a 287(g) agreement with the 
Department of Homeland Security); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-750 (Supp. 2012) (making it a 
misdemeanor if someone eighteen or older fails to carry documentation demonstrating 
lawful immigration status), invalidated by United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 
532 (4th Cir. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1001 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 39. Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-
Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 177 (2010). 
 40. David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of 
Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 45, 54–55 
(2005).  
 41. Kari Huus, Turmoil in Tulsa: The Illegal Immigration Wreck, NBCNEWS.COM (July 
17, 2007, 7:31 PM), http://www.today.com/id/19466978/ns/today-today_news/t/turmoil
-tulsa-illegal-immigration-wreck/#.UfcwZhaPDG4.  
 42. PEW HISPANIC CTR., A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS: A PORTRAIT OF THE 40 MILLION, 
INCLUDING 11 MILLION UNAUTHORIZED 2 (2013), available at pewhispanic.org/files/2013/01
/statistical_portrait_final_jan_29.pdf. 
 43. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 11 (2011) 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (noting that Mexicans comprised 58% of 
the unauthorized population and that immigrants from other parts of Latin America 
comprised 23% of unauthorized immigrants). 
 44. See MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 79 (“With 12 million people out of status 
and temporary worker migration now pushing toward 400,000 per year and constituting the 
bulk of new entrants, the share of migrants who lack full legal rights in the United States has 
never been greater. Undocumented migrants alone now constitute one-third of all immigrants 
in the United States, but . . . the share is much greater among Latin Americans. The large 
share of respondents in our sample who lack documents (62%) thus reflects a fundamental 
facet of contemporary Latino immigration to the United States. Latin Americans living in the 
United States are probably more vulnerable and exploitable than at any point in American 
history.”). 
 45. Annette R. Appell, “Bad” Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV. L.J. 
759, 759 (2007) (explaining that the lack of discussion about child welfare in civil rights and 
critical race studies “is surprising given that children are both primary receivers and 
transmitters of race, ethnicity, culture, language, and values; and that the constitutional civil 
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identity is cultivated. Since child raising norms are often viewed through the lens of 
one’s class, race, and ethnic culture, tensions arise when members of a dominant 
group make childrearing assessments about parents who are members of a less 
powerful, subordinate group. Dominant groups may justify removal of children 
from parents whose identity is perceived as bad or harmful by arguing that it is in 
the child’s best interests.46 Such actions, however, allow members of a dominant 
group to instill in children their preferred culture, language, class, and values. The 
effect of these actions cannot be minimized. As Professor Annette Appell argued, 
when parents lose the ability to transmit these social goods, it “can compromise 
individual, cultural, and even political identity.”47 
Two historical child welfare practices support this assertion.48 “Child-saving” 
agencies in the 1880s sought to save poor children of Irish, Polish, and Italian 
                                                                                                                 
rights to family autonomy—the parental rights so often denigrated—recognize the 
importance of children in the creation and perpetuation of moral values and, ultimately, to a 
diverse and critical polity”). 
 46. The state also constructs abandonment through detention and deportation. See, e.g., 
In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 237–38 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (undocumented parents who 
were investigated for child abuse were reported to ICE by state child welfare authorities). 
Though the allegations of abuse were later found to be unsubstantiated, the parents’ 
separation from their children because of their deportation led the family court to find that 
the parents had abandoned their children and, therefore, their parental rights should be 
terminated. Id. 
 47. Appell, supra note 45, at 760 (“Women who are compliant, English-speaking, not 
ethnically diverse, White, and middle class are most successful in the child welfare system; 
those who diverge from these norms are most likely to lose their motherhood. When mothers 
lose their children, they lose their chance to pass on their language, culture, and values, and 
their children lose their chance to receive these social goods. This loss can compromise 
individual, cultural, and even political identity.”). 
 48. The historical practice of taking children from parents who were viewed as inferior 
was not limited to the United States. For instance, in Spain, under the Franco regime, it is 
now estimated that from 1939 to 1950 up to 30,000 children were taken from their mothers 
after their mothers had been imprisoned for being leftist. A psychiatrist who is claimed to 
have orchestrated these abductions stated, “[T]hose women had inside the seed of Marxism, 
and if those children remained with their mothers, the Marxism [would] grow in those 
children.” Sylvia Poggioli, Families of Spain’s ‘Stolen Babies’ Seek Answers—And 
Reunions, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 14, 2012, 3:18 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12
/14/167053609/families-of-spains-stolen-babies-seek-answers-and-reunions. The process 
continued after Franco’s death and lasted through the 1980s. In later years babies were taken 
from poor mothers and given to affluent, conservative, and devout Catholic families. Id.  
  Additionally, between 1910 and 1975 white Australians removed 100,000 children 
from aboriginal women. Light-skinned children were given to white couples for adoption, 
and dark-skinned children were sent to orphanages. LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA 
ORPHAN ABDUCTION 310 (1999).  
  From 1920 to 1972 the Swiss government removed Roma children from their 
parents and sent them to be raised by non-Roma families. Mary Ellen Tsekos, Minority 
Rights: The Failure of International Law to Protect the Roma, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 26, 26 
(2002), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3tsekos.pdf; see also GORDON, 
supra, at 310. 
  Though some claim it to be a conspiracy theory, others believe that in the late 1940s, 
with the assistance of doctors in Israel, Ashkenazi Jewish women stole babies, who had been 
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immigrants, who were classified as nonwhite on the East Coast, by sending them 
on orphan trains from the East Coast to be raised by families who could “raise him 
far above the class from which he sprang.”49 
Similarly, in the 1800s—at a time when Native Americans were still denied 
American citizenship—Christian missionaries, and later the federal government, 
forcibly removed Native American children from their homes and placed them in 
boarding schools.50 “[T]he aim was the assimilation of Indian children into Anglo-
American society.”51 According to Tsianina Lomawaima, a professor specializing 
in American Indian Studies, the government’s intention behind establishing these 
boarding schools was to “erase and replace” Native American culture.52 Native 
American language, dress, and cultural practices were not allowed in the boarding 
schools.53 Families were discouraged from visiting their children or even knowing 
their location.54 These practices not only resulted in family destruction but also 
caused children to become conflicted about their own racial and cultural 
identities.55 
Further, from 1958 to 1967, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Children’s 
Bureau, and the Child Welfare League of America developed the “Indian Adoption 
Project,” whereby Native American children from western states were taken from 
their biological parents and placed for adoption with non-Native American families 
in the East and Midwest.56 This project came about as the result of ignorance, 
cultural insensitivity, assimilationist goals, and racism.57 
Like these historical child welfare practices that forcibly assimilated children 
into the dominant culture, recent terminations of parental rights, as will be 
described more fully in Part III, suggest similar tensions around identity and 
struggles to cultivate a preferred “American” identity. If a U.S.-citizen child 
                                                                                                                 
born to Sephardic Yemeni Jewish mothers, from the hospital. The Sephardic Yemeni 
mothers were informed that their children had died. GORDON, supra, at 310; see also Joel 
Greenberg, The Babies from Yemen: An Enduring Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at A4. 
 49. GORDON, supra note 48, at 9–12. In her book, Gordon describes a slight twist to the 
normal child-saving practices. A Catholic child-saving agency at the beginning of the 
twentieth century attempted to place immigrant children, who on the East Coast were 
considered nonwhite but who out west were considered white, with Mexican families in a 
small southwestern mining town. Id. at 13–19. Anglos reacted by abducting the immigrant 
children on the grounds that Mexicans—nonwhites—were unfit to raise white children. Id. at 
65–79, 109–117. 
 50. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE 
NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 199–202, 236 (2008) 
[hereinafter THE HARVARD PROJECT]. 
 51. Id. at 199. 
 52. Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(May 12, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=16516865. 
 53. Marsha King, Tribes Confront Painful Legacy of Indian Boarding Schools, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 3, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews
/2004161238_boardingschool03m.html. 
 54. THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 50, at 236. 
 55. King, supra note 53. 
 56. THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 50, at 237. 
 57. Id. 
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follows her mother after her mother’s deportation, she will be raised outside of the 
United States—likely in a poorer country compared to the United States—by a 
mother who is not an American citizen and who may not speak English. Her 
mother cannot instill in her American values, and some argue that the United States 
may view this as a threat to American democracy.58 Even if a child is not a U.S. 
citizen, a juvenile court may still feel compelled to terminate parental rights, 
believing that the child could be brought into “full citizenship” if raised in the 
United States by American parents.59  
Political scientist Samuel Huntington warned in his article, The Hispanic 
Challenge, that because Mexican Americans no longer see themselves as the 
minority that has to accommodate the dominant group and instead are committed to 
their own culture and identity, they pose a threat to American democracy.60 
Huntington argued that “American identity” has been defined by culture and 
creed—a creed that derives from the Anglo-Protestant culture. Huntington further 
stated: 
Key elements of that culture include the English language; Christianity; 
religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, including 
the responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting 
Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that 
humans have the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth, 
a ‘city on a hill.’61  
According to Huntington, this national identity has been threatened by many 
factors, including, but not limited to, individual identities that are based on race, 
ethnicity, and gender. He claimed that the growth of the Latino population 
threatened the values and identity of Anglo-Protestants and the “cultural and 
political integrity” of the nation62 and that the burden to assimilate and adopt the 
culture and values of the United States rests solely on the immigrant, a burden he 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. See Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunification 
Decisions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1147–
52 (arguing that it is in the interest of the State to teach American children “the fundamental 
values of a democratic society” and to keep “children connected to America” and that this 
justifies the State’s interest in not reunifying children with parents following the parents’ 
deportation). 
 59. See GORDON, supra note 48, at 293–94 (describing how the adoption of the 
immigrant children from the Foundling hospital, “would bring the children into a full 
citizenship, unqualified by their parents’ economic or moral failings”). 
 60. Samuel P. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 
30, 44–45, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/03/01/the_hispanic
_challenge. But see Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural 
Nation: The Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1389 
(2005) (critiquing Samuel Huntington’s book, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s 
National Identity, and arguing that a “multiracial, multicultural nation may necessitate a 
more diffuse national identity,” differing from Huntington’s assertion that immigrants must 
assimilate into the Anglo-Protestant identity). 
 61. Huntington, supra note 60, at 31–32. 
 62. Id. at 32–33. 
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claims Hispanics have not met.63 He concluded his piece by stating, “There is no 
Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an 
Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican Americans will share in that dream and in that 
society only if they dream in English.”64 His view is not simply an ivory tower one. 
In 2006 forty-eight percent of Americans believed that “newcomers from other 
countries threaten traditional American values and customs.”65 
One way to maintain an Anglo-American identity is through children. Raising 
children—even if they are children of immigrants—in an English-speaking 
environment by Anglo parents preserves the Anglo-American identity.66 This 
assimilation of sorts is even more important when the children are U.S. citizens, but 
their birth parents are not. 
The intersection of immigration and family law is sorely underexplored, and the 
literature addressing it has not examined the historical relationship between 
immigration law and early child welfare practices and the tensions around identity 
that have existed under both.67 Nor has the literature examined how each area can 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Id. at 36–39. 
 64. Id. at 45. 
 65. MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 71. Jason Richwine, who now works for the 
Heritage Foundation, who coauthored the Heritage Foundation’s study on immigration 
reform, and who received his Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard, argued in his 2009 
dissertation that because current immigrants lack “the average cognitive ability that natives 
possess,” the United States should focus its immigration policies on admitting those with 
high IQs. Jason Richwine, IQ and Immigration Policy 59 (May 1, 2009) (Dissertation, Harvard 
University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc
/140239668/IQ-and-Immigration-Policy-Jason-Richwine. Further, Richwine argued that 
Hispanics have lower IQs than whites, stating, “Finally, it is worth asking ‘how long is too 
long?’ when it comes [sic] Hispanic assimilation. No one knows whether Hispanics will ever 
reach IQ parity with whites, but the prediction that new Hispanic immigrants will have low-
IQ children and grandchildren is difficult to argue against.” Id. at 66. 
 66. Cf. Juan F. Perea, Buscando América: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to 
Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1439 (2004) (arguing that in the educational 
context “[l]anguage-based subordination” has been harmful to Latinos). Perea notes that 
some of the techniques used in the educational context “can be characterized as assimilative 
in nature—pressuring Spanish speakers to abandon their language and culture or to integrate 
into Anglo society as an underclass. Some of the techniques are not assimilative, but rather 
discriminatory—residential or educational segregation, or teacher prejudice against Spanish-
speaking students. All of these techniques, intentionally or not, reflect and enforce a racist, 
subordinating attitude toward Latino students.” Id. Just as in the educational system, the 
family is also another arena where state-intervention can reflect—whether intentionally or 
unintentionally—attempts at assimilation. 
 67. David Thronson’s significant pieces were the first to frame many of the issues that 
arise when these two areas of law intersect. See generally David B. Thronson, Choiceless 
Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1167 (2006); 
Thronson, supra note 40. In addition to David Thronson, a few other scholars have explored 
this intersection. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the 
Child Standard, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 97–101 (2006); Rabin, supra note 16; Sarah 
Rogerson, Unintended and Unavoidable: The Failure to Protect Rule and Its Consequences 
for Undocumented Parents and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 580 (2012); Marcia 
Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 63 (2012); 
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be a forum for cultivating an American identity. This historical relationship is 
important because it illuminates how negative perceptions toward certain 
immigrant groups and Native Americans influenced Anglo assessments of their 
child-rearing practices. Essentially, members of the dominant Anglo culture sought 
to cultivate a preferred American identity by removing children from the care of 
their parents. In this way, these children became a blank slate on which to craft an 
identity, or through which to remove the threat of a competing, alternative 
identity—in a manner that completely disregarded the family’s relationship and 
what would later be established as a constitutional right of the parents to care for 
their children and of the children to be cared for by their parents.68 This Article 
connects these historical practices to contemporary court decisions that terminate 
the parental rights of undocumented parents and suggests that these decisions may 
have more to do with tensions around identity than the protection and welfare of 
children. Moreover, as scholars such as Annette Appell and Dorothy Roberts have 
demonstrated, parents who are outside the dominant cultural norms—poor, racial 
minorities, outlaws—have consistently been more vulnerable to state intervention.69 
Undocumented parents not only face deportation, but also, like other “out” or 
subordinate groups, the loss of their parental rights. When parents lose the right to 
raise their children, they also lose the ability to transmit their culture and values. 
Part I illustrates how, historically, immigration and citizenship laws regulated 
American identity by determining which group of immigrants could immigrate and 
become citizens. It then explores how similar efforts to regulate identity were 
                                                                                                                 
Zug, supra note 58. 
  A few student notes have also examined the prevalence of termination of parental 
rights involving undocumented parents. See generally, e.g., Vinita Andrapalliyal, Note, The 
CPS Took My Baby Away: Threats to Immigrant Parental Rights and a Proposed Federal 
Solution, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2013); Trang Bui, Note, Battle Scars from the Fight 
Between Family Law and Immigration Law: Incarcerated Immigrant Parents and Missouri’s 
Response, 81 UMKC L. REV. 183 (2012); C. Elizabeth Hall, Note, Where Are My 
Children . . . and My Rights? Parental Rights Termination as a Consequence of Deportation, 
60 DUKE L.J. 1459 (2011); Timothy E. Yahner, Note, Splitting the Baby: Immigration, 
Family Law, and the Problem of the Single Deportable Parent, 45 AKRON L. REV. 769 
(2012). 
 68. Cf., Appell, supra note 45, at 759 (“Children are an essential but often overlooked 
bounty in the regulation of race, culture, and rights.”). 
 69. Id. at 759 (exploring the role that culture and language play when Spanish-speaking 
mothers are subject to state intervention); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS 
8–10 (2002) (discussing the disproportionately African American face of the child welfare 
system); Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and 
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 585–87 (1997) (describing the 
way in which the child welfare system focuses on punishing mothers who are outside the 
dominant cultural norms rather than fostering familial reunification); Deseriee A. Kennedy, 
Children, Parents & the State: The Construction of a New Family Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 95–96 (2011) (discussing how laws and policies relating to 
incarcerated parents impede reunification); Janet L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, Judging 
Parents, Judging Place: Poverty, Rurality and Termination of Parental Rights, 77 MO. L. 
REV. 95, 112–13 (2012) [hereinafter Poverty, Rurality and Termination of Parental Rights] 
(examining the way in which poor parents living in rural parts of the country are vulnerable 
to termination of parental rights). 
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present in the child welfare context. The purpose of this Part is to suggest that 
historical tensions around identity and exclusion present in both immigration and 
child welfare law often mirrored one another. In other words, hostility toward a 
particular immigrant group and rejection of its culture and values not only informed 
and influenced immigration policies but also affected the manner in which their 
families were treated.  
Part II explores the ways in which harsh immigration policies and anti-
immigrant sentiment contribute to public perceptions that associate Latino 
immigrants with criminality, cultural deviance, and overarching illegality. This 
background is important for understanding how anti-immigrant biases and hostile 
perceptions toward certain immigrant groups may creep into and undermine child 
welfare proceedings.  
Part III details the constitutional rights that undocumented parents possess and 
illustrates how anti-immigrant animus can threaten the fundamental rights of 
undocumented parents in the family law context. It highlights cases in which the 
parental rights of undocumented Latino parents were terminated, and explores the 
subtle and not so subtle ways in which the identity of the parent was perceived by 
decision-makers to be inferior. Concerns about criminality, as well as a belief that 
Latino immigrants threaten the Anglo-American identity, can result in the loss of 
legal rights for undocumented immigrants: specifically, the right of a parent to raise 
her child and to develop the child’s identity and culture.  
Part IV responds to one scholar’s proposal to change the standard used in 
termination proceedings when such proceedings involve undocumented parents of 
U.S.-citizen children. This Part argues against this approach because it would 
undermine the constitutional rights of undocumented parents and devalue their 
family relationships. 
I. IMMIGRATION AND FAMILY LAW: HISTORICAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF 
EXCLUSION AND THE TENSIONS AROUND CULTIVATING A NATIONAL IDENTITY 
This Part provides an overview of how immigration and citizenship laws 
regulated national identity in the 1800s through the second half of the twentieth 
century by determining who could enter the United States and who could become a 
citizen. It also closely examines the influence of immigration policies and practices 
on migration from Mexico, which continues to affect present day perceptions and 
attitudes toward Latino immigrants. It then examines early child welfare practices 
that removed immigrant and Native American children from their homes because 
Anglos perceived the identity of the children’s parents—their race, culture, 
language, class, and values—to be inferior and un-American.  
This Part’s purpose is to parallel the ways in which tensions around identity and 
its cultivation existed within both immigration law and child welfare practices. 
More precisely, Part A explores the exclusion of Native Americans, Southern and 
Eastern European immigrants, and Mexicans to provide a framework for Part B, 
which details the treatment of their families. Combined, this Part illustrates how 
both forums excluded these groups because their culture, race, and values did not 
align with that of the dominant culture—Anglo-Saxon Northern European.  
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A. Cultivating an Anglo-American Identity Under Immigration and Citizenship Law 
Immigration and citizenship law define who may enter the United States and 
who may join the political community as a U.S. citizen. The history of immigration 
and citizenship law reveals that race and culture—combined with economic and 
political conditions—influenced who was permitted to enter and remain in the 
United States and who was entitled to U.S. citizenship. These laws affected not 
only immigrants but also Native Americans, who were restricted from citizenship 
until nearly the second half of the twentieth century.70 Ultimately, immigrants 
whose identities more closely aligned with those of Anglo-Protestants were treated 
more favorably under immigration and citizenship law.71  
1. Immigration and Citizenship Laws and the Exclusion of Native Americans and 
Southern and Eastern European Immigrants 
As legal scholars such as Ian Haney López and historian Mae Ngai 
demonstrated in their books,72 our nation’s immigration and citizenship laws have 
used race as a basis for restricting who could immigrate to the United States and 
who could become a citizen. These legislative efforts sought to cultivate an Anglo-
American identity within the United States through the law.  
The original qualification for naturalization was premised on race, and whether a 
group was racially eligible for citizenship often depended upon how well it could 
culturally assimilate into Anglo-Protestant society.73 After the Civil Rights Act 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See Nationality Act of 1940 § 201(b), Pub. L. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138 
(providing that “[a] person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, 
Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe” is a national and citizen of the United States). 
 71. See NGAI, supra note 31, at 23 (noting that the 1924 quota law “served 
contemporary prejudices among white Protestant Americans from northern European 
backgrounds and their desire to maintain social and political dominance. Those prejudices 
had informed the restrictionist movement since the late nineteenth century. But the nativism 
that impelled the passage of the act of 1924 articulated a new kind of thinking, in which the 
cultural nationalism of the late nineteenth century had transformed into a nationalism based 
on race.”). See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE (1996) (examining early cases and immigration and naturalization laws to explore the 
legal and social construction of race in America).  
 72. See LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 37 (“Federal law restricted immigration to this country 
on the basis of race for nearly one hundred years, roughly from the Chinese exclusion laws 
of the 1880s until the end of the national origin quotas in 1965.”); NGAI, supra note 31, at 
23. López later explains that birthright citizenship was tied to race until 1940 and naturalized 
citizenship until 1952. LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 39. 
 73. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923) (“The children of English, 
French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly merge into 
the mass of our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their European origin. On 
the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the children born in this country of Hindu parents 
would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry. It is very far from our thought 
to suggest the slightest question of racial superiority or inferiority. What we suggest is 
merely racial difference, and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our 
people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of assimilation.”); LÓPEZ, supra 
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declared that all persons born in the United States (except for “Indians not taxed”) 
were citizens, regardless of race, color, or slavery,74 Congress allowed persons “of 
African nativity” or “African descent” to naturalize.75 It did not remove the 
requirement that a person be white because of concerns about extending citizenship 
to Native Americans and Asians.76 One senator, in explaining his opposition to 
extending citizenship to Native Americans, referred to “the rank, privileges, and 
immunities of citizenship upon the cruel savages who destroyed [Minnesota’s] 
peaceful settlements and massacred the people with circumstances of atrocity too 
horrible to relate.”77 Another senator questioned “whether this door [of citizenship] 
shall now be thrown open to the Asiatic population,” which would result in “an end 
to republican government there [on the Pacific Coast], because it is very well 
ascertained that those people have no appreciation of that form of government; it 
seems to be obnoxious to their very nature; they seem to be incapable either of 
understanding or carrying it out.”78 
Jus soli—the acquisition of citizenship at birth—did not apply to Native 
Americans. In 1884 the Court held that Native American children did not acquire 
citizenship at birth because they owed allegiance to their tribe and not to the United 
States.79 Though the Supreme Court in 1898 held that children of parents racially 
ineligible to naturalize could acquire citizenship at birth,80 this did not include 
Native American children. In 1924 Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act, 
which granted citizenship to Native Americans born in the United States, though it 
was uncertain whether those born after the Act’s enactment were conferred 
citizenship.81 It was not until 1940 that all Native Americans who were born in the 
United States were considered citizens.82 
Racial restrictions on immigration persisted into the twentieth century. Intense 
nativism resulted in the passage of a temporary quota system in 1921,83 which was 
made permanent in 1924.84 This system intentionally discriminated against 
immigrants from eastern and southern Europe who had been arriving in large 
numbers in the early 1900s and who were considered racially and culturally 
                                                                                                                 
note 67, at 79–80 (discussing United States v. Thind and another Supreme Court decision, 
Ozawa v. United States, and explaining that the Court in both cases “abandoned scientific 
explanations of race in favor of those rooted in common knowledge when science failed to 
reinforce popular beliefs about racial differences”). 
 74. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. For a discussion of early citizenship 
laws, see LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 37–47. 
 75. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256. 
 76. LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 43. 
 77. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Hendricks)). 
 78. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
Cowan)). 
 79. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 94 (1884). 
 80. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898). 
 81. Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253; LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 41 
(“[Q]uestions arose regarding the citizenship of those born in the United States after the 
effective date of the 1924 act.”). 
 82. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 201(b), 54 Stat. 1137, 1138. 
 83. Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5.  
 84. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, 159. 
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undesirable.85 The system placed annual quotas on the number of immigrants 
admitted from a particular country, with the quotas based on the 1890 census.86 
Because Northern Europeans constituted the largest group in the 1890 census, it 
received the largest quota.87 In passing this system, Congress acknowledged that it 
wanted “to confine immigration as much as possible to western and northern 
European stock”88 and expressed fears that non-Protestant cultures endangered 
American values.89 For example, the chairman of the immigration committee of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 38; Johnson, supra note 21, at 1127–31(describing how 
the animosity toward southern and eastern Europeans led to the passage of the quota 
system); cf. RODOLFO F. ACUÑA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 185 (Robert 
Miller & Lauren G. Shafer eds., 3d ed. 1988) (describing how some leaders in Congress 
wanted a quota that would limit Mexican migration but others worried that doing so would 
anger agribusiness, which relied upon Mexican labor and would block the bill’s passage). 
Though the Immigration and Naturalization Committee tried to appease the opponents by 
promising that another bill would be presented that would create border patrol and would 
limit Mexican migration, the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee stated that 
the 1924 Act, which would make the quota system permanent, “opens the doors for perhaps 
the worst element that comes into the United States—the Mexican peon . . . [It] opens the 
door wide and unrestricted to the most undesirable people who come under the flag.” 
ACUÑA, supra, at 186. 
 86. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159; see also 
NGAI, supra note 31, at 25 (explaining how the law required the allocation of quotas to 
countries in the same proportion in which Americans traced their origins to those countries). 
Ngai further explains that the problem with developing this system was that national origins 
data regarding immigrants was not recorded until 1899. NGAI, supra note 31, at 25. 
Therefore, the newly established quota board had to create the categories that would make 
up the national origins quota system—that is, “national origin,” “native stock,” 
“nationality”—and also the definitions for these categories. Id. at 25–26. As an example of 
the imprecise and, arguably racist, nature of these categories, “nationality” was defined as 
country of birth, but the law provided that individuals who lived in the United States in 1920 
did not include “(1) immigrants from the [Western Hemisphere] or their descendants, (2) 
aliens ineligible for citizenship or their descendants, (3) the descendants of slave immigrants, 
or (4) the descendants of the American aborigines.” Id. at 26 (quoting Immigration Act of 
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 11(d), 43 Stat. 153, 159). Ngai argued that the system 
“proceeded from the conviction that the American nation was, and should remain, a white 
nation descended from Europe.” Id. at 27. She also noted, “[W]hile the national origins quota 
system intended principally to restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe and 
used the notion of national origins to justify discrimination against immigrants from those 
nations, it did more than divide Europe. It also divided Europe from the non-European 
world. It defined the world formally in terms of country and nationality but also in terms of 
race. The quota system distinguished persons of the ‘colored races’ from ‘white’ persons 
from ‘white’ countries.” Id. 
 87. See Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional 
Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1932–33 (1996) (describing the law and 
explaining how it favored immigrants from northern and western Europe). 
 88. LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 38 (citing Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 
5). 
 89. See DANIELS, supra note 21, at 49 (noting that the impetus for the quota system was 
“the beleaguered feeling of so many old-stock Protestant Americans. Immigrants and their 
non-Protestant cultures, they felt, represented a serious and sustained challenge to American 
660 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:643 
 
House of Representatives argued that the United States was in danger of being 
overtaken by “abnormally twisted” and “unassimilable” Jews, “filthy, un-American 
and often dangerous to their habits.”90 
2. Mexican Migration and the Emergence of a Latino Identity Associated with 
Criminality and Illegal Status 
Mexican immigrants were also excluded under immigration laws, though in 
different ways. In order to contextualize contemporary issues involving Latino 
immigrants that will be discussed throughout this Article, a brief detour into the 
complicated history of America’s immigration policies toward Mexico is 
necessary.  
Mexicans were not racially restricted from naturalization. In 1897 a district 
court in Texas held that though a thirty-seven-year-old Mexican man, Ricardo 
Rodriguez, was not “white,” citizenship could be conferred to him and other 
Mexicans because of rights established by treaties between the United States and 
Mexico.91 While this holding may belie a claim that immigration and citizenship 
laws discriminated against Mexicans, the following section will explore the ways in 
which “[t]heir legal whiteness was contingent and unstable[.]”92  
The border between the United States and Mexico was created in 1848 through 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Mexico had surrendered California, Arizona, 
New Mexico, Texas, and parts of Colorado, Nevada, and Utah.93 Around this time, 
Mexicans provided labor in the southwestern United States in mines, farms, and 
railroads.94  
Despite the unrestricted flow of labor from Mexico to the United States, tensions 
between Mexicans and Anglos were prevalent in the Southwest.95 Historian Linda 
Gordon described the racial relationship between Mexicans and Anglos in a small 
southwestern mining town as “immigrant” and “American”—irrespective of the 
legal citizenship of Mexicans.96 Another historian noted, “Casting Mexicans as 
foreign distanced them both from Euro-Americans culturally and from the 
Southwest as a spatial referent: it stripped Mexicans of the claim of belonging that 
they had had as natives, even as conquered natives.”97 For Mexicans, citizenship—
whether by birth or through naturalization—was not beneficial because regardless 
of their citizenship status, Anglos viewed them as foreigners.98 
In the late 1800s, lynching of Mexicans was so common that southwesterners 
came to believe that white men received trials while Mexicans were hanged.99 In 
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 90. Id. 47–48.  
 91. In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 337, 350–51, 355 (W.D. Tex. 1897); NGAI, supra note 
31, at 53–54. 
 92. NGAI, supra note 31, at 54. 
 93. MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 24–26. 
 94. NGAI, supra note 31, at 129. 
 95. See GORDON, supra note 48, at 24. 
 96. Id. at 312. 
 97. NGAI, supra note 31, at 133 (emphasis in original). 
 98. Id. at 132. 
 99. GORDON, supra note 48, at 268. 
2014] THE IMMIGRANT “OTHER” 661 
 
1873 in Tucson, where Mexicans still maintained greater power compared to other 
locations in the United States, individuals protesting the hanging of white men 
accused of murder stated, “You can hang a Mexican, and you can hang a Jew, and 
you can hang a nigger, but you can’t hang an American citizen.”100 In one Arizona 
county, over the course of a decade in the late 1800s, there were a total of five legal 
hangings—one Native American, one black man, and three Mexicans.101 
These racial tensions did not curb demand for Mexican labor in the United 
States.102 In the early 1900s, U.S. employers relied on private labor contractors to 
recruit Mexican workers. These contractors or recruiters were paid for each worker 
that they obtained. Their practices were called “el enganche,” meaning “the hook” 
or “indentured.”103 The recruiters advanced Mexican laborers money to travel to the 
United States.104 Once the laborers had arrived, they soon discovered that they were 
indenturedlow wages, poor working conditions, and high interest rates had been 
placed on their loans.105  
While the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 imposed a head tax and 
literacy test on arriving immigrants,106 the attorney general exempted Mexicans.107 
Even though the Act was intended to restrict immigration, the government 
excluded Mexicans because of the reliance on Mexican labor within the United 
States.108  
Though the 1924 quota system did not apply to immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere, the formation of Border Patrol that same year, as well as other 
immigration restrictions that were included in the 1924 law, led to a new focus on 
deportation and immigration enforcement, which dramatically increased 
deportations.109 For instance, in 1920 there were 2762 deportations and nine years 
later there were 38,796.110 Border Patrol focused its efforts more aggressively on 
the Mexican border than the Canadian, with Mexicans emerging as “iconic illegal 
aliens.”111 Historian Mae Ngai notes:  
It was ironic that Mexicans became so associated with illegal 
immigration because, unlike Europeans, they were not subject to 
numerical quotas and, unlike Asiatics, they were not excluded as 
racially ineligible to citizenship. But as numerical restriction assumed 
primacy in immigration policy, its enforcement aspectsinspection 
procedures, deportation, the Border Patrol, criminal prosecution, and 
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irregular categories of immigrationcreated many thousands of illegal 
Mexican immigrants.112 
Yet even during this period of enforcement, immigration policies vacillated 
between encouraging more migration from Mexico and carrying out mass 
deportations of Mexicans.113 For example, Mexican laborers were relied upon 
during World War I, but after the stock market crash of 1929, the government 
initiated a deportation campaign that removed 458,000 Mexicans between 1929 and 
1937.114 Instead of providing benefits during the Depression, local relief agencies 
reported Mexicans, including citizens and lawful permanent residents, to 
immigration authorities so that they would be deported.115 Estimates indicate that 
sixty percent of those repatriated during this period were either children or 
American citizens by birth.116 During the 1930s, the size of the Mexican population 
in the United States was reduced by forty-one percent.117  
Immigration policy would shift once again. In the late 1930s, agricultural 
growers claimed a labor shortage, even though the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) argued that one did not exist, and the director of the Texas Works 
Progress Administration stated that labor existed when “reasonable wages” were 
paid.118 Nonetheless, with pressure from members of Congress from southwestern 
districts, the U.S. Employment Service certified that six thousand contract laborers 
should be imported.119 In 1942 President Roosevelt negotiated a treaty with Mexico 
that brought Mexican farmworkers to the United States.120 Termed the “Bracero 
Program,” it provided visas to Mexican workers.121  
The Bracero Program, which ended in 1965, led to greater illegal migration, in 
large part because there were more Mexicans who wanted to become braceros than 
the Mexican government could accommodate.122 Those workers who arrived 
outside of the program came to be referred to as “wetbacks” and some employers 
preferred to hire them because they could pay them “wetback wages.”123 
“Wetbacks” were associated with “misery, disease, crime and many other evils,” 
but these stereotypes extended to all Mexicans.124 An immigration official noted 
that “wetbacks” were “superficially indistinguishable from Mexicans legally in the 
United States.”125  
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With the recession that followed the Korean War, and in response to those 
concerned about unlawful migration, in 1954 the former INS instituted 
“Operation Wetback.”126 It militarized the border and deported undocumented 
migrants.127 At the same time, to appease agricultural growers who relied upon 
Mexican laborers, it increased the number of bracero visas available.  
At one point the INS was raiding agricultural fields in the southwestern 
United States, arresting undocumented workers, transporting them back 
to the border, and deporting them into the waiting arms of officials 
from the U.S. Department of Labor, who promptly processed them as 
braceros and retransported them back to the very fields where they had 
been arrested in the first place!128 
The Bracero Program ended in 1964,129 and a year later, Congress abandoned 
the visa quota system.130 For the first time, however, Congress placed an annual cap 
on migration from the entire Western Hemisphere because of fears of unrestricted 
Latin American migration.131 In 1976 Congress extended the 20,000 
migrant-per-country limit, which had previously applied only to the Eastern 
Hemisphere, to the Western Hemisphere, and also subjected the Western 
Hemisphere to the preference system.132  
Because quotas had never before applied to the Western Hemisphere, the 
avenues for Latinos to migrate legally to the United States became limited. To 
illustrate this point, from 1960 to 1980 the number of migrants who came to the 
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United States annually from Mexico did not change, but illegal entry became much 
more common because legal avenues had been closed off.133 At the same time, 
industries continued to recruit and employ undocumented labor. “During the 
twenty-one-year history of mass undocumented migration, the United States, in 
effect, operated a de facto guest-worker program.”134 Border enforcement 
symbolically reassured a public concerned about illegal migration, but the flow of 
workers to fill jobs in the United States continued.135  
In 1986 Congress attempted to reform the immigration system through the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).136 IRCA did two main things: it 
legalized those who were unlawfully present and had arrived prior to 1982, and it 
created provisions that would sanction employers who knowingly hired 
undocumented workers.137 Though Congress sought to curb future unlawful 
migration by deterring employers from hiring undocumented workers, it did not 
stop employers from doing so.138 
The continued growth of the undocumented population and public resentment 
toward undocumented immigrants in the second half of the twentieth century led to 
harsh immigration policies that were justified based on undesirable attributes 
associated with Latino immigrants.139 In reviewing comments by legislators 
recorded in the Congressional Record from 1994 to 1996, Lina Newton stated: 
The language officials employed to justify [the legislation] combined 
the contemporary ideology of balanced budget conservatism and the 
divisions forged between deserving and undeserving members with 
ascriptive traditions that linked Mexicans to undesirable attributes. Not 
only did deviant constructions of the unauthorized correspond with 
punitive policy measures, but these constructions also accentuated a list 
of qualities and behaviors that marked immigrants more broadly as 
unworthy of consideration for social membership. The immigrant 
family was portrayed as another invasion of the nation, as individuals 
brought their unproductive dependents into the nation: pregnant wives, 
children, and elder family members would end up on welfare or take up 
space in schools, hospitals, and communities.140 
In 1996 Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA),141 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
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(PRWORA),142 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRIRA),143 arguably the most drastic and harsh changes made to our 
U.S. immigration laws. Together, these laws increased border patrol, initiated 
287(g) programs, expanded the crimes that would lead to deportation, restricted 
undocumented immigrants from receiving public benefits, and required family 
members sponsoring immigrants to provide affidavits of support demonstrating that 
their household income was at least 125% above the poverty line.144  
Today, one basis for a common identity among Latinos—likely because of 
anti-immigrant sentiment that has fostered marginalization and exclusion—is 
undocumented status. During a study conducted by Massey and Sánchez, in which 
they interviewed 159 first- and second-generation immigrants of Caribbean, 
Central American, Mexican, and South American origin145 and asked “what 
accounted for the emergence of a common identity among Latin American 
immigrants in the United States,”146 one Mexican man living in New York City 
responded, “Well, maybe you see that we are illegal immigrants.”147 In a follow-up 
question, the interviewer asked whether undocumented status was a basis for 
identity and the man replied, “that is the identity.”148  
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B. The Cultivation of an Anglo National Identity Through Child Welfare Practices: 
The Experiences of Early Immigrants and Native Americans 
Tensions around national identity and how to cultivate that identity have, 
historically, not only been the domain of immigration and citizenship law, but also 
have been present in early child welfare practices. Just as certain groups were 
excluded under immigration and citizenship law, their family relationships were 
devalued as well. Measures taken to protect early immigrant and Native American 
children—in the name of the best interests of the child—also reflected attempts at 
forced assimilation. This Part describes the historical practices of removing 
immigrant and Native American children from their parents.  
1. Early Immigrants and Orphan Trains 
Early child welfare practices elucidate the manner in which hostility toward 
particular immigrant groups influenced assessments about their families. As noted 
above, immigrants from eastern and southern Europe were the targets of anti-
immigrant sentiment because their race, culture, and values were perceived to be 
misaligned with Anglo-Protestants. These perceptions influenced the treatment of 
their family relationships in the child welfare context as well. 
The social construction of race in the late 1800s was slightly different than it is 
today. Knowing the social construction, though, is helpful for understanding the 
way in which race influenced child welfare practices. On the East Coast, 
Anglo-Saxons of Northern European heritage constituted the “superior race.”149 
Those who arrived from other countries were categorized as separate races—“the 
Irish, Italians, Slavs, ‘Hebrew,’ or ‘Hindus,’ for example.”150 Elite Protestants, for 
instance, described the Irish as wild, undisciplined, and primitive.151 That is not to 
say that the Irish were categorized the same as African Americans. According to 
Gordon, “These [race categories] were not physical or cultural descriptions of 
innocuous ‘difference,’ but social and economic markings of rank.”152 Certain 
groups, mostly those from Europe, eventually “worked their way into 
whiteness.”153 The West Coast’s definition included other groups more quickly 
compared with the East Coast, and part of the appeal of living out west was the 
opportunity to be considered white.154 Nevertheless, even there, Mexicans remained 
nonwhite.155  
In 1853, Protestant minister Charles Loring Brace founded the Children’s Aid 
Society and initiated what has been termed “orphan trains.”156 The Children’s Aid 
Society placed orphans157 on trains and sent them to live with families in rural 
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areas, usually out west.158 The parents who received these children viewed it as a 
form of apprenticeship: children could provide needed labor, for instance, on the 
farm.159 The children who were sent on orphan trains came from poor immigrant—
Irish, Italian, or Polish—families, and more than half of the children were being 
raised by single mothers.160 By 1910, over 110,000 orphans had been placed with 
other families.161 In support of his mission, Brace stated:  
When placed in a farmer’s family, he grows up as one of their 
number . . . The peculiar temptations to which he has been subject—
such, for instance, as stealing and vagrancy—are reduced to a 
minimum; his self-respect is raised, and the chances of success held out 
to a laborer in this country . . . soon raise him far above the class from 
which he sprang.162 
Agents—prosperous, white Protestants—who had come to be known as “child 
savers” roamed the streets looking for street children and made minimal efforts to 
locate their parents.163 “The child savers . . . imagined proper child raising in norms 
specific to their class and ethnic culture, as we all do.”164 Poor parents referred to 
these agents as “child stealers,” terrified that their children would be kidnapped.165 
Parents were compelled to give up their children, and it would later be determined 
that in about half of these cases, the removal was based on poverty alone.166   
2. “A Conflict Between Americans and Half-Breed Mexican Indians”167 
Around the same time period, Catholic charities in New York, whose leadership 
was mostly Irish, defended their faith against the mission of the Children’s Aid 
Society to send away orphans it deemed religiously and racially inferior, by 
forming their own child-saving agencies.168 These Catholic agencies were less 
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concerned about racial classifications; instead, their main priority was to grow the 
Catholic faith westward by placing immigrant orphans with Catholic families who 
could transmit Catholic values.169  
One child custody case unearthed by historian Linda Gordon involving orphans 
who were placed out west by a New York City Catholic orphanage, the Foundling, 
illustrates the social construction of race in the early 1900s and its effect on child 
welfare practices. Further, in her examination of this particular child custody case, 
Gordon explores the ways in which race, religion and ethnicity were and continue 
to be “varying, fluid, and easily reshaped.”170  
In 1904 the Foundling sent a group of immigrant orphans on a train to 
Clifton-Morenci, a small mining town in Arizona.171 In looking for homes for the 
orphans, the Foundling’s primary concern was placing the children with Catholic 
families.172 Because most of the Catholic residents in the town were Mexican, a 
local Catholic priest arranged for Mexican families to take in the orphans.173 
Upon the arrival of the orphans, Anglo families in Clifton-Morenci learned that 
these children (who were mostly Irish but were viewed as white) would be taken in 
by Mexican families (who were viewed as nonwhite), which caused them to 
become enraged.174 Because many of the Anglos did not practice any religion, they 
found the transmission of Catholic values to be of little importance.175 “The 
problem as the ladies began to construct it right there at the station was that the 
lovely orphans were Anglos, not only elegantly dressed but also blond and 
light-skinned, and most of the crowd at the station was Mexican.”176 
Rather than following legal procedures, the Anglo families engaged in 
vigilantism in the belief that something needed to be done immediately. Armed 
men, along with a mob of approximately 400 (of a town of about 735 Anglo 
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adults), demanded that the children be turned over.177 The day after the children’s 
arrival in Clifton-Morenci, Anglos summoned a judge to write up the adoption 
papers.178 As Gordon described, “[t]hey were taking their first step toward ex post 
facto legalization of their vigilantism.”179  
The Anglo women’s motives for wanting the children were mixed, as some had 
personal and self-interested reasons (like the Mexicans),180evidencing that they 
were not simply motivated by charity or child saving. Some had fertility 
problems.181 Others had adult children, but desired more children.182 According to 
Gordon, however, “they not only wanted the babies, they were beginning to think it 
wasn’t right for the Mexicans to take the babies, and it is hard to know—perhaps 
even hard for them to know—which came first.”183 
When the matter did reach the courts, Gordon described the trial as both 
entertainment and political discourse.184 Not one Mexican person testified—or was 
even present in the courtroom.185 “It was an Anglo courtroom in its personnel and 
equally in its definitions of non-Anglo people.”186  
Many of the white witnesses focused their testimony on “disparaging the 
Mexicans’ standard of living and morality.”187 According to Anglos being Mexican 
meant being “poor, ignorant, degraded.”188 Anglos referred to Mexicans as unclean, 
even though some Mexican women cleaned the homes of Anglo families.189  
One Anglo woman testified that the orphans were ill when she first saw them, 
and she then described how they were throwing up “chili and beans and tortillas, 
and watermelon, and Mexican beans” and that some of the children had a “very 
strong odor of whiskey and beer.”190 Gordon noted that the vomiting, if true, would 
not have been surprising “since the children may have just drunk Clifton water and 
eaten beans for the first time. They may have had a version of ‘Montezuma’s 
revenge.’ Everyone knew the water was terrible.”191 
There were strong emotions in the courtroom, making it difficult to differentiate 
between real emotion and strategy.192 Lawyers encouraged the Anglo parents to 
display the children to the court so that those present could see that they were being 
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well taken care of by Anglo families.193 According to one newspaper account, when 
a father told his child (one of the orphans) to go to sleep, the child responded, 
“Won’t you watch me so the Mexicans can’t get me?”194  
The children, however, had lived with the Anglo parents for three-and-a-half 
months, creating a conflict between how the children were taken and the 
subsequent bonds that formed.195 “Arguments for the best interests of the child 
could, in the extreme, benefit anyone who kidnapped a child and managed to evade 
capture or legal action for an extended period of time.”196 
Unsurprisingly, the court held that adoption by the Anglo families would be in 
the best interests of the children.197 The judge’s opinion did not describe the 
vigilantism that resulted in the children being kidnapped.198 Instead, he described 
the mob as “committee meetings” and the kidnapping as “volunteer” actions.199 He 
wrote that the events were a conflict between “Americans and half-breed Mexican 
Indians . . . impecunious, illiterate . . . vicious.”200 
3. Native American Children and Cultural Assimilation 
As mentioned in Part I.A, it was not until 1940 that all Native Americans were 
able to acquire citizenship at birth.201 Hostility toward Native Americans led to 
government practices that removed Native American children from their parents in 
order to force cultural assimilation. 
As early as colonial times, missionaries undertook to “educate” Native 
American children.202 In 1819 the federal government created the Civilization Fund 
that provided grants to churches to develop programs that would “civilize the 
Indian.”203 The Commissioner of Indian Services provided a report to Congress in 
1867 stating that the only way to deal with the “Indian problem” was to separate 
children from their tribes.204 In the late 1860s President Grant directed church 
missionaries, as part of his Peace Policy, to “Americanize” Native Americans 
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through education and to provide social services for the purpose of 
“pacification.”205  
Native American families were torn apart in an effort to assimilate Native 
American children into mainstream Anglo culture. For example, federal practices in 
1884 included placing Native American children on farms in the East and Midwest 
so that they would learn the “values of work and the benefits of civilization.”206 
Around the same time period, the government and private institutions established 
mission boarding schools. As part of this program, children were forcibly removed 
from their homes and placed in boarding schools.207  
Comments by the founder of one of the first boarding schools illustrate how the 
goal of these schools was in essence to cultivate a preferred identity—one that 
reflected Anglo norms. The founder, Colonel Richard Pratt, said in 1892: 
A great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead one, and 
that high sanction of his destruction has been an enormous factor in 
promoting Indian massacres. In a sense, I agree with the sentiment, but 
only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill 
the Indian in him, and save the man.208 
He went on to explain that former slaves were able to assimilate because of their 
association with the “higher race” (that is, slave owners), but that the Native 
American remained a “savage.” He stated: 
The schools did not make [African Americans] citizens, the schools did 
not teach them the language, nor make them industrious and self-
supporting. Denied the right of schools, they became English-speaking 
and industrious through the influences of association. Scattered here 
and there, under the care and authority of individuals of the higher race, 
they learned self-support and something of citizenship, and so reached 
their present place. No other influence or force would have so speedily 
accomplished such a result. Left in Africa, surrounded by their fellow-
savages, our seven millions of industrious black fellow-citizens would 
still be savages. Transferred into these new surroundings and 
experiences, behold the result. They became English-speaking and 
civilized, because forced into association with English-speaking and 
civilized people; became healthy and multiplied, because they were 
property; and industrious, because industry, which brings contentment 
and health, was a necessary quality to increase their value. 
 The Indians under our care remained savage, because forced back 
upon themselves and away from association with English-speaking and 
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civilized people, and because of our savage example and treatment of 
them.209 
In cultivating this preferred identity, or “Americanizing” the Indian, the 
orchestrators viewed their efforts as necessary for the preservation of a civilized 
Anglo society. The Federal Board of Indian Commissioners in 1880 noted: 
As a savage, we cannot tolerate him any more than as a half-civilized 
parasite, wanderer or vagabond. The only alternative left is to fit him by 
education for civilized life. The Indian, though a simple child of nature 
with mental facilities dwarfed and shriveled, while groping his way for 
generations in the darkness of barbarism, already sees the importance 
of education . . . .210 
Though federal policies in the 1930s shifted away from placing Native 
American children in boarding schools, the destruction of Native American 
families continued. In 1959 the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Children’s 
Bureau, and the Child Welfare League of America developed the “Indian Adoption 
Project,” which removed approximately 400 Indian children from their homes and 
placed them with white families in the East and Midwest.211 The project lasted until 
1967.212 It is estimated that between 1941 and 1978, sixty percent of Native 
American children were removed from their homes and placed either in orphanages 
or with white families.213 
Recognizing that “there is no resource that is more vital to the continued 
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,” Congress passed the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978.214 At the time of its passage, extensive 
testimony described the harmful effects these practices had on Native American 
families and the preservation of Native American culture. During congressional 
hearings, one tribal chief noted:  
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if 
our children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal 
heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to 
the ways of their People. Furthermore, these practices seriously 
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undercut the tribes’ ability to continue as self-governing communities. 
Probably in no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be 
respected than in an area as socially and culturally determinative as 
family relationships.215  
He went on to convey how these practices were being carried out because of 
cultural biases and ignorance and reflected attempts to destroy Native American 
cultural identity:  
Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural parents 
by nontribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently 
evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life 
and childrearing. Many of the individuals who decide the fate of our 
children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst 
contemptful of the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually to a 
non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian child.216  
Early child welfare practices toward Native Americans and immigrants illustrate 
how negative perceptions about their culture, race, class, and values led to practices 
that devalued and destroyed their family relationships. Though members of the 
dominant Anglo society justified these actions in the name of protecting children, 
they were also efforts—some more explicit than others—to cultivate a preferred 
Anglo-American identity or to remove the threat of a competing identity. 
II. CONTEMPORARY HOSTILITY TOWARD UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
Part I provided a historical overview of how immigration and citizenship laws, 
as well child welfare practices, excluded groups whose culture, race, class, and 
values did not align with the dominant Anglo-American culture.  
This Part explores how current anti-immigrant sentiment frames perceptions 
about Latino immigrants. First, changes in migration patterns that have resulted in a 
large influx of Latino immigrants into previously homogenous communities have 
resulted in hostility toward newcomers. Second, these tensions, along with a 
pervasive national anti-immigrant rhetoric, have led to increased legislation at the 
state and local level, which seeks to make life so prohibitive for undocumented 
immigrants that they will presumably self deport.217 Combine these local measures 
                                                                                                                 
 
 215. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34 (1989) (quoting 
Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs & Pub. Lands of the H. Comm. 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 193 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings] 
(statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians)). 
 216. Id. at 34–35 (quoting 1978 Hearings, supra note 215, at 191–92 (statement of 
Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief, Missisippi Band of Choctaw Indians)). 
 217. McKanders, supra note 39, at 177; see also MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KATE BRICK, 
REG’L MIGRATION STUDY GRP., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND MEXICAN/CENTRAL 
AMERICAN MIGRATION FLOWS: THEN AND NOW 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/rmsg-regionalflows.pdf (explaining the factors that 
motivate migration, including push and pull factors and social networks). “Push factors” 
refer to conditions in the sending country, which encourage outflow of members of the 
674 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:643 
 
with harsh federal immigration laws that focus enforcement efforts largely on the 
criminal justice system, and the result is that the identity of the undocumented 
immigrant is transformed into not only a violator of immigration laws, but also a 
criminal and culturally deviant person.  
A. Changing Migration Patterns & Community Tensions 
In 2010 estimates placed the number of undocumented immigrants within the 
United States at approximately 11.2 million.218 Though there was a slight decline in 
migration over the past two years, the undocumented population has tripled since 
1990.219 Of the 11.2 million undocumented immigrants, 8 million are in the 
workforce.220  
Migration patterns have also changed largely as a result of industries—such as 
meatpacking—that rely upon undocumented labor relocating from large urban 
centers to small rural communities.221 Between 2000 and 2009, for example, the 
Central American populations doubled in Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington—states that in the past have 
not had large immigrant populations.222 
Today, immigrants are residing in previously homogenous communities where 
“[t]he sense of who is a newcomer spans generations, not years; counties, not 
countries.”223 These migration changes have led to tensions within many 
communities.224 For instance, in 2006 in Grand Island, Nebraska, Latinos 
comprised eleven percent of the town’s population of 450,000.225 Since Latinos did 
not begin arriving until the 1980s, this growth occurred fairly rapidly.226 One native 
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of Grand Island noted, “A lot of people don’t like the Latinos, they just don’t.”227 
He went on to state, “There has been more bigotry . . . because there has just been 
more and more and more of them.”228 When ICE raided the Swift meatpacking 
plant in 2006 and other Latino immigrants protested afterward outside the factory, 
some townspeople held up signs reading, “Go back to Mexico, wetbacks.”229 As 
one scholar noted, “When faced with a sudden, destabilizing change in local 
demographics, and when a salient national rhetoric politicizes that demographic 
change, people’s views turn anti-immigrant.”230  
The demographic changes also place new economic constraints on communities. 
School districts must respond to the growing needs of Limited English Proficient 
(LEP) students.231 Lack of affordable housing and social services for low-income 
Latino residents create financial strains as well.232  
B. Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Criminalization of Immigration Violations 
In recent years, states and local governments have increasingly passed anti-
immigrant legislation and ordinances. Additionally, the federal government has 
expanded the relationship between the immigration and criminal justice systems. 
These efforts have contributed to the exclusion and marginalization of Latinos.233  
In 2011, 1607 bills and resolutions regarding immigration were introduced by 
state legislatures.234 Not all of the legislation was “anti-immigrant.” Some laws 
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sought to combat human trafficking,235 provide in-state tuition to those without 
lawful immigration status,236 and provide services to undocumented immigrants.237 
The top issues addressed by most of the legislation, however, continued to be “anti-
immigrant,” and concerned issues such as driver’s licenses, unauthorized 
employment of undocumented immigrants, and cooperation between local and 
federal law enforcement officials (287(g) programs) to enforce immigration 
laws.238  
These anti-immigrant measures have ranged from high profile multi-issue 
legislation to the passage of local anti-immigrant ordinances. The most high profile 
legislation, of course, has been Arizona’s S.B. 1040.239 Other states, such as 
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Utah, and Indiana have followed Arizona’s 
lead.240 Additionally, five states introduced legislation in 2012 that would require 
law enforcement officers to request proof of immigration status during lawful 
stops, allow undocumented immigrants to be charged criminally for failure to carry 
documents that demonstrate lawful immigration status, and would create penalties 
for the harboring and transportation of undocumented immigrants.241 In recent 
years, local governments, such as in Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Freemont, Nebraska; 
and Valley Park, Missouri, have passed ordinances, which were later challenged in 
court, that sought to prohibit undocumented immigrants from renting housing, 
obtaining public benefits, and working.242  
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Additionally, with the expansion of crimes leading to deportation, the 
immigration system has become more and more integrated into the criminal justice 
system.243 Over the years, Congress has expanded the list of crimes that lead to 
deportation.244 Local law enforcement is increasingly entering into Memoranda of 
Understanding with ICE to coordinate enforcement efforts.245 In 2011 immigration 
offenses accounted for nearly thirty-five percent of criminal prosecutions in federal 
court.246 
Moreover, while Congress has not imposed criminal sanctions for workers who 
work without authorization,247 workplace raids have led to the prosecution of 
thousands for aggravated identity theft, social security fraud, and other crimes 
relating to the use of false documents, reinforcing the image of undocumented 
immigrants as dangerous lawbreakers.248 This is not to minimize the significance of 
identity theft, but the criminal label that attaches to the undocumented immigrant 
who wanted to work seems incongruous.249 
The criminalization of immigrants and a national anti-immigrant rhetoric foster 
negative stereotypes about Latinos.250 These stereotypes portray Latinos as 
dangerous and culturally deviant. A U.S. Representative for Oklahoma, John 
Sullivan, in support of efforts to train local sheriffs to enforce immigration laws 
under the federal government’s 287(g) program, stated that “[he] want[ed] to create 
fear in rapists, drunk drivers, drug dealers and people who conceal weapons,” 
associating immigrants with dangerous criminal behavior.251 A sheriff in North 
Carolina, who is under investigation by the Department of Justice for racial 
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profiling, stated: “Their values are a lot different, their morals, than what we have 
here . . . . In Mexico, there’s nothing wrong with having sex with a 12-, 13-year-old 
girl . . . . They do a lot of drinking down in Mexico.”252  
Such stereotypes affect all Latinos—irrespective of immigration status. “Latin 
Americans living in the United States are probably more vulnerable and exploitable 
than at any point in American history.”253 
III. TERMINATIONS OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
In their book, Brokered Boundaries: Creating Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times, 
Douglas Massey and Magaly Sánchez explore the role that anti-immigrant 
sentiment and hostility play in shaping the experiences of Latinos in the United 
States. In doing so, they look specifically at discrimination toward Latino 
immigrants in the workplace. This Article, and this Part in particular, seeks to 
explore how negative perceptions of Latino immigrants—and specific notions 
about what culture and values are best for their children—can impact parental 
fitness determinations and can lead to a devaluation of certain family relationships, 
often in a manner that violates the legal rights of both children and parents. 
Like the historical practices discussed in Part I, contemporary views about 
undocumented immigrants may be influencing decisions to terminate parental 
rights. Negative perceptions about Latino parents—their language, race, culture, 
immigration status, national origin, and class—lead to biased assessments about 
their fitness as parents and their children’s best interests. Informing these biases 
may be an underlying belief that cultivating an “American” rather than a “Latino” 
identity is best for children—particularly U.S.-citizen children of undocumented 
parents—and best for the United States. More precisely, issues of race and culture 
become intertwined with attitudes about immigration policy and what the racial and 
cultural makeup of the United States should be. 
The historical child welfare practices described in Part I reflected policies and 
practices aimed at removing children from parents who had been deemed 
undesirable. Contemporary actions taken against undocumented parents are not part 
of an official policy or practice to tear these families apart. But the terminations of 
parental rights that are occurring today, which often go unnoticed, are just as 
troubling because the effects are similar—they tear families apart because of biases 
surrounding the identity of the parent.  
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A. Undocumented Parents’ Rights Are Protected Under the Constitution 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”254 The Due Process Clause 
requires more than fair process.255 When fundamental rights and liberty interests 
are at stake, heightened protection must be afforded against governmental 
interference.256  
The right to parent one’s child is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests” recognized by the Supreme Court.257 As the Supreme Court noted, 
parents’ fundamental interest in raising their child “does not evaporate simply 
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their 
child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital 
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”258  
A parent’s right in this regard is not absolute, however. The State, as parens 
patriae, has an interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of children within 
its jurisdiction and can intervene in situations of abuse, abandonment, and neglect 
and terminate parental rights.259 Because a state possesses enormous power, a 
parent must be found unfit by clear and convincing evidence.260 “Few 
consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family 
ties.”261 This higher standard balances the rights of natural parents with the State’s 
parens patriae interests.262 After a finding of unfitness, a court will then assess 
whether termination is in the child’s best interest.263 
An undocumented parent’s interest in raising her child is no less fundamental 
than a citizen parent’s interest. Undocumented immigrants are considered 
“persons” entitled to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.264 The “Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ 
within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, 
unlawful, temporary or permanent.”265  
B. Termination Proceedings and Undocumented Parents 
Biases within child welfare departments and juvenile courts about 
undocumented immigrants are influencing assessments about their fitness as 
parents. Some of these termination decisions purport to be about the best interests 
of the child—like the historical examples discussed in Part I—but these decisions 
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also reveal tensions around identity and how best to cultivate a preferred American 
identity.266  
Determining the motivations influencing each of these decisions is, of course, 
difficult, and there are likely many different and competing ones. The termination 
cases discussed below involved parents who required assistance and support, and, 
as is the case in many best interest assessments, there was likely a “better” family 
available to care for the child.267 As one family court judge observed, “One 
wonders if any natural parents of children in foster care could pass muster if the 
superior capabilities of the foster parents are the measure of ‘best interests.’”268 At 
the same time, issues that are raised in these decisions, such as a comparison of 
resources between the United States and that of the parent’s country, the parent’s 
undocumented immigration status, the “un-American” culture and values of the 
parent, do reveal the way biases creep into and influence parental fitness and best 
interest determinations involving immigrant parents and their children. I posit that 
underlying these biases may be a larger tension around identity (“American” versus 
“other”), and a conscious or unconscious assessment by decision makers about 
which identity is better for children.  
1. Immigration Status 
Some courts and child welfare departments explicitly discriminate against 
undocumented parents because of their undocumented immigration status, equating 
this status with abuse and/or neglect.269 An attorney in Michigan, for instance, 
stated that during one termination proceeding, his department argued that an 
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undocumented father was “abusive or neglectful of his child because he is an illegal 
alien who is in danger of being arrested every time he walks out the door.”270 
According to this attorney, “[T]he theory is that because of his immigration status 
and lack of contingency plans for his child, should he be arrested on an 
immigration hold, he places his child at a substantial risk of harm.”271 Another 
attorney who works for the child welfare department in Jacksonville, Florida, 
shared a similar view noting: 
Typically, as a policy, we are reluctant to recommend a placement with 
a parent that we know is not legally here, because our position 
representing the best interests of the child is to ensure [they] have 
permanency and not set them up for further disappointment. To be 
placed back with a parent that may at any time be deported is not truly 
in the best interest of children. . . . [A]s a policy for the program, we 
typically don’t like to make those recommendations knowing full well 
that the parent is not documented.272 
A juvenile court in Georgia terminated an undocumented father’s parental 
rights, indicating that he “had done nothing to legalize his residency in the United 
States.”273 After the court found that the mother failed to comply with her 
reunification plan, in part because she “lived with and financially relied upon a man 
who . . . was an illegal alien,” it terminated her parental rights.274 With regard to the 
decision concerning the father’s parental rights, the appellate court reversed the 
decision, noting that the father had complied with the reunification plan and made 
meaningful efforts to maintain a parental bond with his child.275 The court stated 
that the father’s parental rights were terminated by the juvenile court not because of 
parental misconduct, but because of the possibility that the father could be 
deported.276 The court went on to explain: “A court may not sever a parent-child 
relationship solely because it has determined that the child might enjoy certain 
advantages elsewhere.”277 Though it was a physical altercation between the mother 
and father that led to state intervention, the juvenile court’s bias surrounding the 
father’s immigration status provided the basis for terminating his parental rights. 
While the appellate court reversed and noted that the possibility of deportation to a 
less affluent country cannot serve as a basis for termination of parental rights, it did 
not explicitly address the strong bias relating to immigration status and “illegality” 
that permeated the juvenile court’s decision.278 
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Likewise, the juvenile court in Encarnación Maria Bail Romero’s termination 
case—the case mentioned in the Introduction—determined that Bail Romero’s 
undocumented immigration status supported its finding that she was an unfit, law-
breaking mother.279 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the initial termination 
and adoption and remanded the case back to the juvenile court, but it did not 
acknowledge the bias and hostility surrounding her status.280  
Unsurprisingly, on remand the same juvenile court focused extensively on Bail 
Romero’s and her relatives’ immigration status. Through its repeated references to 
the illegal status of her relatives,281 Bail Romero’s status as a “convicted felon,”282 
her previous unlawful employment and presence in the United States without 
authorization, which the court referred to as “criminal activity,”283 and her 
testimony that she would cross the border illegally again,284 the court painted a 
picture of a law-breaking mother to bolster its finding of unfitness. At one point the 
decision stated:  
Ms. Romero and her family were always at risk of being arrested and 
deported. Yet, even with a newborn son, she elected to remain at risk in 
the United States instead of returning to Guatemala where she had two 
other children that she had not seen for years, an extended family and, 
perhaps most importantly, lawful residency.285  
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in affirming the juvenile court’s second 
decision terminating the mother’s parental rights, found that the juvenile court did 
not improperly focus on the mother’s immigration status.286 The Court of Appeals 
described her immigration status as “an unavoidable fact” and noted that it 
“properly played a part in reviewing Mother’s past behavior, predicted future 
behavior, and possible future harm to Child.”287 
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As the above cases demonstrate, in termination proceedings, a parent’s 
immigration status can be used to show that the parent not only violated 
immigration laws, but, by extension, is also an irresponsible and unfit parent. In 
some ways, these negative perceptions toward undocumented parents mirror 
congressional legislation that has increasingly criminalized immigration 
violations.288 As Congress—and even some states—transforms traditionally civil 
immigration violations into criminal ones, the label attached to the violator also 
changes. Undocumented immigrants no longer commit civil immigration offenses, 
but instead criminal ones. And the criminal label attaches to the undocumented 
person. 
This criminal characterization has permeated family law assessments. The 
law-breaking father who could not legalize his status became an unfit parent who 
could not offer a stable life to his child. Similarly, Bail Romero’s violation of 
immigration laws and use of false documents served as evidence of a mother who 
was continuing to engage in criminal activity, placing her child at risk. 
David Thronson—one of the first scholars to explore the intersection of 
immigration and family law—noted that “[j]udges who discriminate on the basis of 
immigration status reflect acceptance, consciously or otherwise, of a pervasive 
societal narrative that constructs an expanding notion of unworthiness and 
‘illegality’ regarding undocumented immigrants and a diminished popular sense 
regarding the availability of protection from prejudice and discrimination.”289 This 
expanding notion of illegality has the potential to construct the personhood of the 
undocumented parent and to influence assessments concerning parental fitness. 
Crossing the border unlawfully and living in the United States as an 
undocumented person can be precarious for children and parents, but characterizing 
this as parental unfitness ignores the complicated choices parents face and the 
limited options available to provide for their children. By taking a broader view, the 
actions of undocumented parents should represent equities in the child welfare 
context.290 Often, these are parents who desperately want to care for and provide 
for their children, which can be their primary motivation for migrating.291 In 
Bail Romero’s situation, though she was convicted of a felony for using fraudulent 
documents, she used these identity documents to work and provide for her 
children.292 Likewise, as a single mother, her decision to leave two of her children 
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behind in Guatemala is one that many undocumented parents are compelled to 
make in order to support their families. As noted by anthropologist Deborah 
Boehm, “For mothers . . . the motivations to migrate are especially complicated—
women typically migrate to reunite with a male partner or because of the necessity 
to work after being abandoned by a spouse. Transnational parenthood, and 
particularly ‘transnational motherhood’ . . . is indeed riddled with difficult 
decisions, ambivalent emotions, and multiple negotiations in the face of limited 
options.”293 
Immigration status is not always an irrelevant factor in child welfare 
proceedings.294 For instance, it may be a necessary consideration in determining 
child custody when one parent is deported but the other remains in the 
United States. It is also an appropriate consideration when assessing the family’s 
situation, generally. 
The use of immigration status in child welfare proceedings becomes a problem 
when it is used to characterize a parent who is here unlawfully as illegal, unworthy, 
and automatically an abusive and/or neglectful parent simply by virtue of her 
undocumented immigration status. This leaves all undocumented parents—who 
work without authorization, cross the border unlawfully to provide for their 
families, and live without documentation in the United States knowing that they 
may be deported—at risk of termination of their parental rights because they are 
undocumented.  
2. Culture and Values 
In some termination decisions, greater emphasis is placed on American cultural 
values, which is often to the detriment of the parent’s culture. In In re B.A.,295 for 
example, the parental rights of an undocumented mother from Mexico, who was 
serving a twenty-one-month sentence, were terminated by a district court in 
Iowa.296 
The district court stated that there was no “practical alternative” to terminating 
the mother’s parental rights, despite the fact that the mother provided the child 
welfare department with the names and contact information of relatives in Mexico 
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who could care for her children until her release.297 The Mexican Consulate 
arranged a home study, conducted criminal background checks of the relatives, and 
offered to make arrangements for the placement of children with their relatives.298 
Still, child welfare authorities refused to place the children with them.299 Instead, 
over the course of eighteen months the children were placed with five foster 
families—none of whom the children had previously known.300 The department, in 
fact, terminated one placement because of allegations of excessive drinking and sex 
parties.301  
The State argued that terminating the mother’s rights was in the best interests of 
her children because they had never been to Mexico and did not know their 
relatives there.302 The district court agreed, stating: 
Though the boys were very bonded to their mother at the time of her 
arrest, that bond has naturally diminished. Bryan and Richard are 
clearly bonded to their current foster parents who have gone to great 
lengths to assist the boys in maintaining contact with their mother and 
will likely continue that contact in the future. Because of the passage of 
time and the lack of another practical alternative, Bryan and Richard 
are now fully integrated into the English-speaking, Iowa culture. They 
are six- and four-year-old boys who were dual citizens of Mexico and 
the United States but who have never been to Mexico. They live in a 
safe, nurturing home with foster parents who hope to adopt them and 
will encourage the boys to remain aware of their now dual heritage. 
Termination of parental rights is clearly in their best interests.303 
The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the termination, highlighting the special 
relationship between the children and their mother, and the mother’s ability to care 
for them.304 Though the end result was positive, the fact that the juvenile court 
based its decision on the children’s integration into the English speaking, Iowa 
culture is troubling. Essentially, the transmission of the English language and 
“Iowan” values were afforded greater weight than the mother’s constitutional right 
to raise her children and the strong bond that existed between her and her children.  
In another termination case involving undocumented parents of a U.S.-citizen 
child, a physician, who treated the child for anemia and an ear infection, reported 
the family to child welfare services because of the child’s failure to thrive.305 Child 
welfare services placed the child in foster care while the parents received services 
to facilitate reunification.306 At the termination hearing, numerous social workers 
testified that the parents had made significant progress in improving their parenting 
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skills.307 Yet the jury found that the parents engaged in conduct that endangered the 
child’s well-being, a finding the appellate court affirmed.308 The dissent, however, 
highlighted something subtle, yet important, that may have influenced decision 
makers:  
[I]t is noteworthy that Child Welfare said that this child is “adoptable” 
and they are planning to place him with an American family. While it is 
true that this child was “Born in the U.S.A.” his heritage and culture are 
Hispanic. To tear asunder the parent-child bond would also entail 
separating him from his brothers, sisters, grand-parents, etc. This would 
destroy the extended family bond that is especially important. It cannot 
be said that it is in this child's best interest to be torn apart from not 
only his parents but his other relatives that love him, and be placed with 
strangers.309  
This statement is a keen observation of a possible underlying preference by 
some decision makers to have U.S.-citizen children placed with American families 
who can transmit American values to the children. Far less weight, particularly 
when the parents’ resources are limited, is given to those social goods that 
undocumented parents can transmit and to the importance of family bonds. 
3. National Origin, Class, and Life as an Undocumented Immigrant 
A parent who comes from a poorer country, such as Mexico or Guatemala, is 
more vulnerable to termination of parental rights—not necessarily because of 
parental unfitness, but because of the belief that a more prosperous life in the 
United States would be better for their children.310 One child welfare attorney 
stated: “When you break down the cases, placement with parents in Mexico 
happens very rarely. In my cases it might have happened every five years. The 
kneejerk reaction of almost everyone is that children are better off in [the] U.S.”311 
An undocumented father’s rights were terminated because he wanted to bring his 
children to Mexico. The attorney explained: 
The father had taken sole custody of the children after charges were 
filed against the mother. He had never been accused of any neglectful 
behavior. Through [sic] the judge was otherwise ready to close the case 
entirely and let the family live without CPS [Child Protective Services] 
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supervision, the judge refused to do so because the father said he 
wanted to go to Mexico. The lawyer for the department made the 
allusion that the kids couldn’t be better off in Mexico, so why would 
we want them to go there? I argued that it was in the best interest of the 
children to let them be with their father, but the court did not see it that 
way.312 
A juvenile court in Michigan terminated the parental rights of undocumented 
parents following their deportation, stating that it was in the U.S.-citizen children’s 
best interests to live in the United States.313 After unsubstantiated allegations of 
abuse, the Department of Child Welfare Services actually informed ICE of the 
parents’ undocumented status, which led to their deportation.314 Following the 
parents’ deportation, the court determined that the children—three of whom were 
U.S. citizens—would have a “better and more prosperous life in the United States 
than in Guatemala.”315 The decision was reversed on appeal.316 
The belief that it is in children’s best interests to remain in the United States 
without their parents than in a poorer country with their parents represents 
socioeconomic, racial, cultural, and global inequity that plays out in this context as 
a cultural clash. As the above cases and comments by attorneys illustrate, part of 
this clash has to do with the weight given to certain factors, like prosperity and 
educational opportunities, at the expense of others, such as the parent/child 
relationship and the language and culture of one’s biological parents.317 A 
statement by one attorney, in support of his department’s unofficial policy of not 
reunifying deported parents with their children, exemplifies the emphasis placed on 
certain social goods. He states, “Most of our [Mexican] parents don’t have 
education themselves; they are poor and they don’t have the ability to pay for 
further education.”318 
Decision makers also fear sending children to a country about which they may 
know very little. In some instances, neither the consulate nor child welfare services 
in the parent’s country of origin were contacted.319 Instead, assumptions were made 
about the country and what life would be like there for the children.320 In another 
                                                                                                                 
 
 312. Id. at 47. 
 313. In re B., 756 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 
 314. Id. at 237. 
 315. Id. at 241. 
 316. Id. at 242. 
 317. For instance, one guardian ad litem, supporting the termination of an undocumented 
father who the Idaho Supreme Court found to be fit stated: “I think it’s in the best interest of 
[the daughter] obviously to remain in the United States because there’s no comparison 
between being in Mexico and being in the United States, being a United States citizen. She 
has all the luxuries or all the things that we can offer.” In re Termination of Parental Rights 
of Doe, 281 P.3d 95, 102 (Idaho 2012). 
 318. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 46. 
 319. Id. at 47–50 (noting that few child welfare departments contact foreign consulates). 
 320. See In re B., 756 N.W.2d at 238 (indicating that a caseworker contacted the 
Guatemalan embassy and “performed an Internet search for possible services in Guatemala” 
but was not successful in obtaining services for Guatemalan parents); State v. Maria L. (In re 
Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009) (court noting on appeal that the 
688 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:643 
 
situation, discussed supra, though the Mexican consulate remained actively 
involved—providing homes studies and criminal background checks of relatives in 
Mexico—child welfare authorities were “skeptical” about placing children with 
relatives in Mexico while their parents were incarcerated in the United States. 
Instead, child welfare authorities placed the children with five different foster 
families in the United States.321  
A parent’s poverty in the United States and every day restrictions attendant with 
life as an undocumented immigrant can also lead to state intervention. As legal 
scholar Dorothy Roberts notes, poverty continues to be used in the child welfare 
context as evidence of a parental deficit that justifies state intervention rather than a 
social deficit.322 This is a chronic problem that leaves poor parents, and particularly 
poor parents of color, vulnerable to state intervention. It has a unique impact on the 
undocumented parent.  
Undocumented persons are denied most public benefits.323 Based on the 
percentage of undocumented immigrants living below the poverty line,324 having 
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 324. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 33, at iv (“A third of the children of unauthorized 
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no social aid poses enormous challenges and can lead to allegations of neglect.325 
Inability to obtain public benefits can also affect the services that are provided to 
the parent after the state has intervened. If an undocumented immigrant cannot 
show that she completed her case plan and received all necessary services, she may 
be denied reunification with her children.326 
In a termination case mentioned above, child welfare services indicated that the 
child was malnourished.327 Child welfare workers stated that his parents fed him 
milk, tortillas, sopas, eggs, and beans,328 and indicated that this diet was too heavy 
in dairy and lacking in vegetables and meat.329 Aside from cultural differences in 
diet, the parents’ limited resources also influenced the food he was served. The 
dissent noted that the parents, undocumented immigrants from Mexico, were 
ineligible for food stamps and welfare benefits, and the only form of public 
assistance they were receiving were Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) 
benefits.330 WIC provided milk, cheese, and cereal, so “[i]t naturally follows that 
the child's diet was heavy on milk and dairy products.”331 
Bail Romero’s situation highlights the difficulties faced by undocumented 
immigrants because of restrictions placed on every day life and because of 
immigration enforcement. For instance, when a Parents as Teachers (PAT) worker 
visited Bail Romero in jail, following Bail Romero’s arrest during a workplace 
raid, she stated that Bail Romero’s son was weak because Bail Romero gave him 
whole milk rather than 2 percent.332 Bail Romero explained that she did not have a 
ride to the city to pick up formula offered through the WIC program.333 Davenport 
found Bail Romero’s response dubious, noting that Bail Romero had previously 
obtained rides to go to work.334 Bail Romero replied that people without documents 
are afraid to drive.335  
                                                                                                                 
immigrants and a fifth of adult unauthorized immigrants lives in poverty. This is nearly 
double the poverty rate for children of U.S.-born parents (18%) or for U.S.-born adults 
(10%).”).  
 325. See, e.g., In re Interest of V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing 
a juvenile court order that terminated an undocumented father’s parental rights, in part, 
because of the father’s failure to obtain basic child care items for his seven month old son 
and failure to find a place to live). 
 326. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., No. 0360–09–4, 2009 
WL 1851017, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (noting that though child welfare services 
worked with the mother after her children were removed from the home as a result of the 
mother leaving the children unsupervised while she went for a job interview, these services 
were limited “because mother was an illegal immigrant”); WESSLER, supra note 15, at 54–55 
(explaining that child welfare authorities often do not place children with undocumented 
relatives because these relatives cannot access needed public benefits and cannot be provided 
with the resources to financially support these children). 
 327. In re Interest of S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 75–76 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
 328. Id. at 86. 
 329. Id. at 93. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Encarnación Interview, supra note 292, at 3. 
 333. Id. at 8. 
 334. Id.  
 335. Id.  
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Child welfare departments may deny reunification based on activities that most 
undocumented immigrants engage in—driving without a license and working 
without authorization. For example, some child welfare departments refuse to 
reunify an undocumented parent with her child if she drives without a license.336 
This refusal significantly disadvantages undocumented parents because, in virtually 
every state throughout the United States, undocumented immigrants are prohibited 
from obtaining drivers’ licenses.337 Therefore, they either rely on public 
transportation, or, if they live in areas where public transportation is unavailable, 
they must decide whether to drive—often to work—without a license.338 
Similarly, in certain jurisdictions, a parent who is unable to show evidence of a 
lawful source of income—for instance, with pay stubs—cannot reunify with her 
child because she has no acceptable documentation to prove she has the means to 
provide for her child.339  
Immigration detention can also thwart parents’ efforts to communicate with 
their children. While visiting with Bail Romero in jail, Davenport told Bail Romero 
that she waited too long following her arrest to communicate with family to let 
them know what happened to her.340 Bail Romero stated that she did not call 
because there was no telephone available.341 She explained that once she learned 
that she could make calls, she worried that the collect calls would be too expensive 
for family members.342 In fact, when she did try to call, her family members did not 
accept the calls because of the cost.343 Nonetheless, Bail Romero noted, “Right 
now, I want to communicate with my son, but I don’t want to cost anybody 
anything. I wish I could call where my son is.”344 Yet both the Missouri Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 
 336. See WESSLER, supra note 15, at 20–21 (explaining that in Oscelo County, Florida, 
and Maricopa and Pima counties in Arizona, lack of verifiable employment can prevent 
reunification with children, and that in Duplin County, North Carolina and Austin, Texas, 
driving without a license is used as evidence that the parent did not comply with the case 
plan). 
 337. As a result of the REAL ID Act, in order for driver’s licenses to be used for federal 
identification purposes, the state must ensure that licenses are issued only to U.S. citizens or 
nationals and those with lawful immigration status. REAL ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418, 109th 
Cong. § 202(c)(2)(B). Most states adhere to this practice because not doing so would deny 
their residents the ability to use their licenses for federal identification purposes. See 
LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 12, at 1225–28. 
 338. See State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Neb. 2009) 
(involving one undocumented mother whose rights were terminated because she did not 
bring her sick child to the hospital even though she explained to child welfare authorities that 
she thought her child was better and that she did not have a car or a ride to get to the 
hospital).  
 339. See WESSLER, supra note 15, at 20; see also In re Interest of V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 
493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the juvenile court found father’s inability to obtain 
permanent employment with benefits constituted a reason for terminating his parental 
rights). 
 340. Encarnación Interview, supra note 292, at 10. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 11. 
 344. Id. 
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Court and Juvenile Court faulted Bail Romero for not maintaining sufficient 
contact with her son nor expressing a personal interest in his welfare.345  
4. Denial of Legal Protection 
When undocumented families are subjected to exclusion, they are increasingly 
denied legal protection. This becomes justifiable because the parent is 
undocumented and, by extension, neglectful. The denial of legal protection can and 
does subvert the fundamental rights of undocumented parents.346 Bail Romero’s 
situation most vividly illustrates this point. 
In Bail Romero’s case, assistance from an employee of a well-respected state-
funded organization, Parents as Teachers, whose mission is to support and 
strengthen families, determined that Bail Romero’s family was not worth saving.347 
Laura Davenport, a PAT employee, assisted Bail Romero after her son Carlos was 
born. After Bail Romero’s arrest, when it appeared that her relatives were 
struggling to care for Carlos, Davenport stepped in.348 She was concerned about 
                                                                                                                 
 
 345. See S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 817 (Mo. 
2011). 
 346. The Southern Poverty Law Center filed a complaint on behalf of an immigrant 
Mexican mother whose daughter was taken from her in the hospital two days after her 
daughter’s birth by officials with the Mississippi Department of Human Services. Complaint 
at 2, Cruz v. Miss. Dep’t Human Servs., No. 3:10cv446HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. Aug. 12, 
2010), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/cruz. Someone from 
the social services department and a Spanish-speaking patient advocate questioned the 
mother in the hospital, in Spanish, despite the fact that the mother only spoke an indigenous 
language, Chatino. Id. at 6. Department officials claimed that the mother admitted to trading 
sex for housing and that she wanted to give her child up for adoption. Id. at 7. The child was 
removed from the hospital and given to a white attorney couple in Mississippi, who regularly 
practiced before the judge that approved the adoption. Id. at 1. The daughter was eventually 
returned to the mother after the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for 
Civil Rights and the Administration for Children and Families conducted an investigation 
into the matter. Id. at 20–21. 
 347. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *12, *15–16 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 
18, 2012) (on file with author). For more information about the Parents as Teachers program, 
see About Us, PARENTS AS TEACHERS, http://www.parentsasteachers.org. 
 348.  See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *15–16. This raises 
interesting questions about the dependent relationship that may form between a person 
providing assistance and the parent. The parent may come to rely on this person, but this 
reliance and vulnerability may expose the parent in ways that can be detrimental to the 
parent. This represents a difficult situation because a mandated reporter is required to inform 
authorities when a child’s well-being is in danger. At the same time, the provision of 
services allows a parent to learn and improve upon parenting skills, which can create 
dependency on the child welfare workers. In the termination of parental rights case In re 
Interest of S.H.A., the parents did not immediately take their child to the doctor because they 
did not have the money or transportation to do so. 728 S.W.2d 73, 95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) 
(McClung, J., dissenting). Instead, they contacted the social worker who had been providing 
assistance to the family. Id. They believed the social worker could take the child to the 
doctor the following day. Id. Because the parents did not take the child immediately, he was 
removed from the home. Id. Yet the dissent noted: 
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Carlos’s welfare.349 Yet even though she was a mandated reporter,350 based on the 
record, it does not appear that Child Protective Services was ever contacted.  
Instead, she asked one couple to help take care of Carlos and then later, knowing 
of a local couple that was interested in adopting a Latino child, Davenport visited 
Bail Romero in jail in order to solicit Carlos’s adoption.351 During her visit, she told 
Bail Romero not to “think of adoption as something ugly.”352 When Bail Romero 
told her that she wanted to return to Guatemala with Carlos, Davenport replied: 
But this is a pretty story that you are thinking so you don’t have to [go] 
back alone. You’re not thinking about the well-being of your son. 
You’re only thinking about yourself. It is true you are the mother. You 
did give birth to him. But that is not true love when you’re not thinking 
about the best for your child. Because the future of your child in 
Guatemala is not good. You have two children already there who your 
sister takes care of. You don’t have another sister to take care of 
another child[.]353 
She later told Bail Romero that if she raised him in Guatemala, Carlos would not 
have an education, and “[h]e’ll just be a factory worker.”354 She also stated that it 
was “a blessing from the Lord that they picked you up.”355  
Davenport also asked questions of Bail Romero relating to sexual/reproductive 
matters. She asked Bail Romero whether there were men in the prison, and 
Bail Romero replied that there were but the men and women were separated.356 
Immediately after, Davenport asked Bail Romero whether her tubes were tied.357 At 
the very end of the conversation, Davenport questioned Bail Romero about what 
she was doing in Guatemala before coming to the United States.358 Bail Romero 
responded that she was working, trying to come to the United States and “wasn’t 
doing other things.”359 Davenport stated, “[w]ell, you were doing ‘other things,’ 
                                                                                                                 
While these workers’ substantial efforts to assist the family in whatever way 
possible are to be applauded and encouraged, it is cruel and unfair to allow 
these parents to become dependent on the Child Welfare Department and then 
have the department use acts of the parents caused by this dependency as a 
basis for terminating their parental rights.  
Id. 
 349. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *15–16 (noting that the child was 
being fed whole milk, had not received proper immunizations, was slow both to sit up and 
crawl, had poor muscle development, and it is unclear whether Carlos was examined by any 
medical staff during this time period).  
 350. Carthage R-IX Sch. Dist. v. Homa, at *10 (Bd. of Educ. of Carthage R-IX Sch. Dist. 
Aug. 31, 2009) (on file with author) (providing that Davenport’s boss, Lynda Homa, 
admitted during a hearing before the Board that she was a mandated reporter). 
 351. Id. at *6. 
 352. Encarnación Inteview, supra note 292, at 11. 
 353. Id. at 3. 
 354. Id. at 4. 
 355. Id. at 3. 
 356. Id. at 10. 
 357. Id.  
 358. Id. at 13. 
 359. Id. 
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because you had Carlos. So, you weren’t just working. You were doing ‘other 
things.’”360 
The school board later terminated Davenport’s boss from her position, finding 
that she engaged in “immoral conduct” as a result of approving Davenport’s jail 
visit.361  
Less than a month after this visit, one local couple, the Velazcos, who 
Davenport identified to help care for Carlos and who for a few months had assisted 
Bail Romero’s relatives in caring for him, gave Carlos to another couple, the 
Mosers, who were interested in adopting a child.362 Two days after their first 
overnight visit with Carlos, the Mosers moved to terminate Bail Romero’s rights 
and adopt Carlos.363  
The denial of legal protection continued. Bail Romero was not listed on the 
notice for a hearing to transfer custody, nor was it sent to her. 364 The summons and 
petition that were served to her were in English, even though she did not read or 
speak English.365 She lacked counsel for months.366 Approximately eight months 
after the initial petition was served, the Mosers, the couple interested in adopting 
Carlos, hired an attorney for her.367 When the juvenile court held the termination 
hearing, Bail Romero was not present.368 The only people who offered testimony 
were the Mosers, the Velazcos, and Davenport.369 The juvenile court terminated 
Bail Romero’s parental rights and approved the adoption.370 
Missouri law is meant to protect parents from transfers prior to the filing of a 
court petition in order “to prohibit the indiscriminate transfer of children, the 
concept that a parent could pass them on like chattel to a new owner.”371 Those 
who are authorized to place a child for adoption in Missouri include: the family 
services division of the Department of Social Services, a licensed child placing 
agency, the child’s parents, or an intermediary, which the statute states may be a 
licensed attorney, licensed physician, or clergy of the parents.372 The Velazcos 
asserted that they were clergy, though they were never Bail Romero’s clergy, and, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 360. Id. 
 361. Carthage R-IX Sch. Dist. v. Homa at *18 (Bd. of Educ. of Carthage R-IX Sch. Dist. 
Aug. 31, 2009) (on file with author).  
 362. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *21 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 18, 
2012) (on file with author). 
 363. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 802 (Mo. 2011) 
(noting that the Velazco’s first overnight visit with Carlos was on October 3, 2007 and a 
petition was filed October 5, 2007).  
 364. Id. at 803.  
 365. Id.; In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *23.  
 366. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d, at 803. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id.  
 369. See id. 
 370. See id. at 804.  
 371. Peggy v. Michael (In re Baby Girl), 850 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Mo. 1993).  
 372. MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.14 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis added). 
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therefore, not authorized to place Carlos with the Mosers.373 On appeal the 
Missouri Supreme Court found no manifest injustice and justified the actions, 
noting that Carlos needed immediate care.374 
Child welfare services did not intervene until nearly five years after the first 
termination hearing, which prevented Bail Romero from receiving services to 
facilitate reunification with her son.375 Under the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act (AFSA), child welfare agencies are required to show that they made 
reasonable efforts to provide assistance and services to families to prevent the 
removal of a child from the home, and, if the child has been removed, to achieve 
reunification with the parent.376 While some states specify certain circumstances in 
which reasonable efforts need not be provided, none under Missouri law applied to 
Bail Romero’s situation.377 Instead, Bail Romero was faulted for not availing 
herself of services like a public defender who would have been able to provide her 
with contact information for child welfare authorities,378 or utilizing volunteers in 
jail to translate documents for her.379 
Additionally, most of the information provided to the juvenile court about 
Bail Romero came from Davenport. Though Davenport undoubtedly wanted to 
help, and believed she was acting in Carlos’s best interests, her own cultural and 
racial biases about Bail Romero framed how the juvenile court viewed 
Bail Romero. It was Davenport’s testimony that characterized Bail Romero as a 
neglectful mother who fed her son two-percent milk instead of formula, lived with 
too many people in one apartment, and co-slept with her son on a pallet on the 
floor.380 This testimony continued to be relied upon even in the second termination 
opinion to support the court’s conclusion that Bail Romero neglected her son.381  
To be sure, it is possible that Bail Romero might have been subjected to similar 
biases by child welfare workers, which could have hindered her ability to reunify 
                                                                                                                 
 
 373. See Appellant’s Substitute Reply Brief at 14–15, S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption 
of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011) (No. SC 91141) (on file with author) (noting that 
the Velazcos were not clergy of Bail Romero). 
 374. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 803. 
 375. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *51–52 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 
18, 2012) (on file with author) (“In this matter, the minor child was never under the care of 
the Children’s Division and the termination of parental rights action was brought by the 
Mosers instead of the State in connection with their adoption petition as allowed by law.”). 
 376. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 
500. 
 377. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.183 (West 2010 & Supp. 2013) (providing that 
reasonable efforts need not be made when the parent has murdered a child of the parent; 
committed voluntary manslaughter of a child of parent; aided or abetted, conspired or 
solicited to commit such murder or manslaughter; committed a felony assault that seriously 
injured child or another child of parent; or subjected child to severe or recurrent acts of 
physical, emotional, or sexual abuse).  
 378. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *20. 
 379. See id. at *25. 
 380. Id. at *12–13. 
 381. See id.; see also S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 
801–02 (Mo. 2011) (noting that Bail Romero fed Carlos whole milk, slept on a the floor with 
him, and that the living conditions were “poor”). 
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with Carlos. Additionally, Bail Romero made mistakes and likely needed additional 
support.382 Yet the actions taken against her evidence the sheer vulnerability 
undocumented parents face. Parents have a fundamental interest in raising their 
biological children and this interest “does not evaporate simply because they have 
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the 
State.”383 
The biases toward undocumented Latino parents impact how they are treated in 
juvenile court when assessments are made concerning their parental fitness and the 
best interests of their children. Ultimately, these decisions become value 
assessments that afford greater weight to certain social goods—such as wealth, 
Anglo-American cultural values, and the English language—and diminish the 
social and cultural goods of their parents, and by doing so afford less protection to 
their constitutional right to raise their children. Undocumented parents cannot 
change the resources available in their country of origin, most cannot legalize their 
status, and they cannot change their native language and culture. Yet it does not 
follow that they should also lose their children. 
C. The Prevalence of the Problem 
Undocumented parents are losing their parental rights. The exact number of 
cases is difficult to determine because juvenile court decisions are frequently 
sealed.384 Moreover, most family court decisions are not appealed.385 Studies such 
as the one conducted by the Applied Research Center, however, reveal that these 
cases are not rare.386 As one judge in Southwest Florida commented:  
                                                                                                                 
 
 382. For instance, during the second termination proceeding, it was revealed through 
hospital records from Carlos’s birth that Bail Romero had left the hospital while Carlos was 
still in the nursery. Bail Romero did not notify anyone that she was leaving. She did return to 
bring Carlos home with her. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *34–35. 
 383. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 384. See WESSLER, supra note 15, at 22–25; see also UNIV. OF ARIZ., supra note 16, at 2 
(stating that through its research, attorneys, judges, and case workers all reported experience 
with cases involving parents in immigration detention or deportation proceedings); Rabin, 
supra note 16, at 114–18 (2011) (noting that because the child welfare system and ICE do 
not collect this information, it is difficult to determine the number of the families affected). 
The Department of Human Services Inspector General reported that from 1998 to 2007, 
108,434 parents of U.S.-citizen children were deported. Rabin, supra note 16, at 114. 
Additionally, Rabin conducted surveys and interviews of personnel in the Pima County 
Juvenile System to determine the frequency with which children are involved with the child 
welfare system as a result of a parent’s deportation. Based on the information she gathered, 
Rabin concluded that “the numbers of such cases in the system suggest that immigration 
status arises frequently enough for it to be an issue about which personnel in the child 
welfare system are aware, but not so frequently that they are accustomed to dealing with 
such cases in a prescribed, uniform manner.” Id. at 118. 
 385. See Thronson, supra note 40, at 54 (noting that few family court decisions are 
appealed). 
 386. See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re Termination of the 
Parental Rights of Doe, 281 P.3d 95 (Idaho 2012); In re B., 756 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2008); In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011); State v. Maria L. (In re 
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Our child protection system has had very little, almost non-existent 
success at reunifying children, whether born in the USA or in a foreign 
country, with parents who come to the USA (1) undocumented, (2) 
poor, (3) uneducated/illiterate, (4) unable to communicate in English, 
(5) culturally segregated. . . . If children of these parents come into 
care, they are virtually doomed by these five factors and the probability 
of permanent loss of these children is overwhelmingly high.387 
There are 5.5 million children in the United States with at least one 
undocumented parent.388 Three quarters of these children are U.S. citizens.389 With 
increased immigration enforcement, parents and children living in mixed status 
households face the threat of separation. For example, from approximately 2000 to 
2009, the government deported over 100,000 parents who had U.S.-citizen 
children.390 The Applied Research Center (ARC) conservatively estimates that 
there are currently 5,100 children in foster care that have either a parent detained by 
ICE or a parent that has been deported, representing 1.25 percent of the total foster 
care population.391 According to the ARC, “If these rates continue through the next 
five years, at least 15,000 additional children will face threats to reunification with 
their detained and deported mothers and fathers.”392  
There are various ways that children of undocumented parents come into contact 
with the child welfare system. When an undocumented parent is arrested by ICE— 
for instance, during a workplace raid—and later detained, it can cause family 
separation, which then may result in state intervention.393 In other instances, an 
undocumented parent is investigated for or charged with abuse or neglect.394 ICE 
                                                                                                                 
Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009); State v. Mercedes S. (In re Interest of 
Mainor T.), 674 N.W.2d 442 (Neb. 2004); In re Interest of E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 
2012); see also Complaint at 2, Cruz v. Miss. Dep’t Human Servs., No. 3:10cv446HTW-
LRA (S.D. Miss. Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/case
-docket/cruz; WESSLER, supra note 15, at 22–24. 
 387. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 18. 
 388. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 33, at 7. 
 389. Id. 
 390. AJAY CHAUDRY, RANDY CAPPS, JUAN MANUEL PEDROZA, ROSE MARIA CASTANEDA, 
ROBERT SANTOS & MOLLY M. SCOTT, URBAN INST., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org
/UploadedPDF/412020_FacingOurFuture_final.pdf. 
 391. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 23. 
 392. Id. 
 393. See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 390, at 13–26 (describing family separations as a 
result of immigration enforcement); see also S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of 
C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011) (undocumented mother arrested during a workplace 
raid). 
 394. See, e.g., Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 8, 2009) (finding that mom, who plead guilty to child cruelty for leaving children 
alone while she worked, and who lived in unhygienic living conditions, supported 
termination of her parental rights); In re B., 756 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) 
(reversing termination involving undocumented parents whose rights had been terminated by 
the juvenile court following their deportation); State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica 
L.), 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009) (reversing termination of mother’s rights in which mom 
who identified herself to police as the babysitter was arrested for obstructing a government 
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may be notified in these circumstances, resulting in the parent’s apprehension by 
ICE and subsequent removal from the United States.395 Even if these reports are 
unsubstantiated at a later date, the parent’s deportation may become the 
justification for termination of parental rights.396 Some cases involve an 
undocumented parent who is incarcerated because of a criminal conviction, 
resulting in separation from his or her child.397 After completion of the criminal 
sentence, the parent may be deported.398  
Because of family separations due to immigration enforcement, as well as 
reports indicating that undocumented parents are losing their parental rights, 
Congress recently introduced legislation aimed at protecting immigrant children 
                                                                                                                 
operation, her children were taken into protective custody, and she was later taken into 
custody by ICE, deported, and had her parental rights terminated); State v. Mercedes S. (In 
re Interest of Mainor T.), 674 N.W.2d 442 (Neb. 2004) (reversing termination of mother’s 
parental rights in case where mom’s striking of child led to incarceration, ICE placing an 
immigration hold on her, and her deportation); State v. Lopez-Navor, 951 A.2d 508 (R.I. 
2008) (upholding termination of mother’s rights where mom did not report her husband’s 
abuse of her children to the police, arguing that her status as an undocumented immigrant 
made her afraid to report husband to the police, which the Rhode Island Supreme Court said 
was not a defense); In re Interest of S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding 
termination of parental rights of undocumented parents accused of neglecting their sixteen-
month-old son).  
 395. See, e.g., In re B., 756 N.W.2d at 237; In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 
82; In re Interest of Mainor T., 674 N.W.2d at 449. 
 396. During investigation by child welfare workers, one mom was arrested and placed in 
removal proceedings. As a result of her deportation, a petition for termination of her parental 
rights was filed because of her failure to comply with the case plan and because her children 
had spent more than fifteen months of the most recent twenty-two months in foster care. See 
In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 84. In another case, child welfare authorities 
reported the parents to ICE and then used their deportation to construct a claim of 
abandonment. See In re B., 756 N.W.2d at 237. In Texas, a mom with six U.S.-citizen 
children was charged with neglectful supervision and child endangerment after someone 
reported seeing the mother’s three-year-old playing near a highway. WESSLER, supra 
note 15, at 32. Border Patrol checked her criminal record, and she was charged with illegal 
reentry because she had been deported previously. Id. Because she faced a minimum of two 
years of incarceration and then deportation, her parental rights were terminated. According 
to her attorney, “If she were a citizen, she would have been bonded out in 24 hours. She 
would not have lost her kids.” Id.  
 397. See, e.g., In re Interest of C.T., 544 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding 
termination of father’s parental rights, which had been terminated while he was incarcerated 
because of a felony conviction); In re RH, 524 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 
termination of undocumented father’s parental rights who was incarcerated for cocaine 
distribution); In re B.A., 705 N.W.2d 507 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished table decision) 
(reversing the termination of mother’s parental rights where father pled guilty to conspiracy 
to distribute methamphetamine and mother pled guilty to misprision of felony); Dep’t of 
Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 975339 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. April 26, 2005) (upholding termination of mother’s rights after she had been arrested 
on felony theft charges, served her criminal sentence, was transferred to ICE custody, and 
then deported); Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 
1847638 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (declining to terminate parental rights of Ghanaian 
father who had been arrested, incarcerated for importing drugs, and deported).  
 398. See, e.g., Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1; Ibrahim, 2000 WL 1847638, at *1. 
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and parents impacted by immigration enforcement. The Humane Enforcement and 
Legal Protections for Separated Children Act introduced in the Senate would 
require child welfare authorities, the Governor of the state, and relevant state and 
local law enforcement officials to be notified before or, if that is not possible, 
immediately after the commencement of immigration enforcement.399 The bill 
provides that parents should be screened by social workers or case workers to 
determine whether they have children and allow such individuals to make free, 
confidential telephone calls to arrange for the care of their children.400 Moreover, 
the bill also provides that parents detained as a result of immigration enforcement 
should have access to their children, courts, child welfare agencies, and consular 
officials.401 It would also require state child welfare agencies to develop policies 
and trainings for handling cases involving children separated from undocumented 
parents.402 A similar bill introduced in the House states that all decisions relating to 
the care, custody, and placement of children should be in the best interest of the 
child, “including the best outcome for the family of the child” and that such 
decisions be “based on clearly articulated factors that do not include predictions or 
conclusions about immigration status or pending Federal immigration 
proceedings.”403 A companion bill introduced in the House, the Help Separated 
Families Act of 2012, would prohibit a state from terminating parental rights of a 
fit parent who has been deported unless the state has (a) made reasonable efforts to 
identify, locate, and contact the parent of the child; (b) notified them of the intent of 
the State to file the petition; (c) attempted to reunify the child with the parent, and 
(d) it is determined that the parent is unfit or unwilling to parent the child.404 
Additionally, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act would allow deported parents with U.S.-citizen children to 
return to the United States and apply for the Registered Provisional Immigrant 
Visa, which would facilitate family reunification405 This legislation contains 
provisions that instruct against the termination of parental rights of undocumented 
parents because of deportation and/or detention, and would prohibit child welfare 
departments from refusing to place children with undocumented family 
members.406 Another provision would require child welfare workers to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 399. Humane Enforcement and Legal Protections for Separated Children Act, S. 1399, 
112th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2011). 
 400. Id. § 3(b)(1)–(2). 
 401. Id. § 4. 
 402. Id. § 6. 
 403. Humane Enforcement and Legal Protections for Separated Children Act, H.R. 2607, 
112th Cong. § 6 (2011). 
 404. Help Separated Families Act of 2012, H.R. 6128, 112th Cong. § 6 (2012). 
 405. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 
113th Cong. § 2101(b)(3)(B) (2013); see also Seth Freed Wessler, Immigration Bill Includes 
Protections for Families Separated by Deportation, COLOR LINES (Apr. 17, 2013, 10:06 AM), 
http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/04/immigration_bill_allows_some_deportees_with
_family_to_return_helps_unite_separated_families.html. 
 406. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, 
S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2107(b)–(c) (2013) (noting, for instance, at § 2107(b) that “[a] 
compelling reason for a State not to file (or to join in the filing of) a petition to terminate 
parental rights . . . shall include: (A) the removal of the parent from the United States . . . or 
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communicate with families in their primary language.407 Finally, in addition to this 
legislation, ICE released a new policy aimed at protecting parental interests during 
immigration enforcement, noting that it “will maintain a comprehensive process for 
identifying, placing, monitoring, accommodating, and removing alien parents or 
legal guardians of minor children while safeguarding their parental rights.”408 
IV. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF CULTIVATING A NATIONAL IDENTITY UNDER 
FAMILY LAW  
Legal scholar Marcia Yablon-Zug proposed that “[i]n reunification cases 
involving parents facing deportation, the rights of children who are American 
citizens should outweigh the rights of their noncitizen parents.”409 She argued that 
in these circumstances a best interest approach should be followed, which would 
allow for a fit undocumented parent’s rights to be terminated, if it is in the citizen 
child’s best interests.410 According to Zug, the State has an interest in protecting 
                                                                                                                 
(B) the involvement of the parent in (including detention pursuant to) an immigration 
proceeding, unless the parent is unfit or unwilling to be a parent of the child” and providing 
at § 2107(c)(1)(B) that the “immigration status alone of a parent, legal guardian, or relative 
shall not disqualify the parent, legal guardian, or relative from being a placement for a 
child”). 
 407. Id. § 2107(c)(34); see also Wessler, supra note 405.  
 408. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACILITATING PARENTAL INTERESTS 
IN THE COURSE OF CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/parental_interest_directive_signed.pdf 
(providing that a Parental Rights Coordinator and Field Parental Rights Coordinators will 
assist parents who are separated from their children as a result of immigration enforcement). 
Among other things, the policy states that, when practicable, ICE will not transfer parents 
who are in child welfare proceedings to a detention facility outside of the family court’s 
jurisdiction. Id. at 4. The policy also directs ICE officials to detain parents in a location that 
is accessible to the parent’s children and will facilitate parent/child visitation when required 
by family court or child welfare proceedings. Id. The policy notes that, when practicable, 
parents will be allowed to make in-court appearances when they are involved with child 
welfare proceedings, or participate via video or teleconference. Id. at 4–5. The Field Parental 
Rights Coordinators are directed to help make provisions for the child’s travel and 
reunification with a parent who will be removed. If a parent has been removed and a family 
court requires the parent’s in person presence, ICE, on a case-by-case basis, will determine 
whether to facilitate the parent’s temporary return for these purposes. Id.  
 409. Zug, supra note 58, at 1172–79. In discussing the problems with a parental rights 
approach in the context of immigrant children facing separation due to immigration 
enforcement, Zug discusses the following issues that arise: (1) a state has an interest in 
keeping U.S.-citizen children in America; (2) reunification to a country that is poorer and 
where conditions may be dangerous may not be in a child’s best interests; (3) the differing 
statuses of parent and child can create situations in which a parent does not act in the child’s 
best interests; (4) in situations of abuse and/or neglect, after a parent has been deported, child 
protective services no longer has oversight over the parents and child, and services for 
parents may be limited in countries with fewer resources; and (5) reunification with a 
deported parent may not provide stability and security for a child who has formed 
attachments with foster parents. 
 410. Id. But see Sarah Rogerson, Unintended and Unavoidable: The Failure to Protect 
Rule and Its Consequences for Undocumented Parents and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. 
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U.S.-citizen children of undocumented parents because when a child follows a 
parent after deportation, American democratic ideals and values cannot be passed 
on to children who are not only outside of the country but who also do not have 
citizen parents to transmit them.411 Zug acknowledges that this solution is not 
perfect and that there are other solutions to prevent such separations, but that these 
other solutions “seem infeasible given the current political climate.”412 To be clear, 
she does not argue that parents of different cultures are bad parents, only that the 
State has an interest in keeping U.S.-citizen children in the United States when they 
do not have citizen parents to transmit those democratic values to them. She 
qualified her proposal by noting, “immigrant parents will only have their rights 
terminated when termination is in their child’s best interests, and most of the time 
termination will not be. Rarely will better resources or opportunities be enough, by 
themselves, to overcome the benefits of remaining with a loving and caring 
parent.”413 
This Part argues against changing the standard for undocumented parents of 
U.S.-citizen children and maintains that the same standard that is used in all 
termination proceedings—first proof of parental unfitness and then an assessment 
of the best interests of the child—should be applied. A state’s interest in 
terminating parental rights does not begin until after a parent has been proven 
unfit.414 As the Supreme Court recognized, “the State registers no gain towards its 
declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.”415 
Because of this, the State must first prove parental unfitness before assessing best 
interests. 416 
The problem with shifting the standard only when a case involves an 
undocumented parent of a U.S.-citizen child, is that it has greater potential, because 
the best interest standard is subjective and value-laden, to use the family as an 
arena for cultivating a preferred identity. The history involving early immigrants, as 
well as Native Americans, combined with contemporary termination cases 
described in Part III, demonstrate the dangers of using the law to change family 
composition in order to cultivate identity. When identity is cultivated under the 
law, the culture and values of the dominant culture will likely prevail, leaving 
members of a subordinate group—such as undocumented parents—excluded and 
denied legal protection. 
Removing the fitness threshold would further perpetuate the exclusion of 
undocumented immigrants by suggesting that undocumented parents do not have a 
fundamental interest in raising their children. When parents, and more specifically 
a subset of parents, are denied this most basic and fundamental right, the value 
ascribed to these family relationships is diminished, and it does not necessarily 
protect children. 417 Instead, the denial of rights to undocumented parents infers that 
                                                                                                                 
REV. 580, 585 n.79 (2012) (cautioning against Zug’s suggested approach).  
 411. Zug, supra note 58, at 1151–52. 
 412. Id. at 1152–53. 
 413. Id. at 1181. 
 414. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766–67 (1982). 
 415. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). 
 416. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766–67. 
 417. Martin Guggenheim, The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado about Nothing?, in 
CHILD, PARENT, & STATE: LAW AND POLICY READER 27, 29 (S. Randall Humm, Beate Anna 
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their family bonds are somehow different and unworthy of protection. This does 
hurt children because their biological parents are a part of their identity, even after 
termination. When their parents are marginalized and excluded, by extension so too 
are they.  
Shifting to a best interest approach is likely to continue the comparison of 
resources in the United States with those in the parent’s country of origin. This will 
raise the question, would this child be better off in a village with no running water, 
or in a home in the United States with a middle-class family?418 Such questions will 
place undocumented parents in a quandary. Many, like Bail Romero, made the 
decision to come unlawfully to the United States to provide for their children in 
ways that they could not in their home country. In fact, “poverty and the promise of 
opportunity are undeniably key drivers of migration.”419 Once the state intervenes, 
the conditions from which they fled become the very conditions supporting their 
separation from their children. Considering current practices that equate poverty 
with neglect, it is difficult to imagine terminations not increasing if the standard is 
shifted. 420  
Zug’s concern that a child may return to a dangerous situation is an important 
one.421 There may be circumstances where a child will indeed face serious harm 
because of conditions in the parent’s home country, and the parent desires 
reunification. While the parent may not be responsible for these conditions, the 
choice to bring her child into a dangerous environment—which, of course, may be 
a “choiceless choice”422—warrants a careful and thoughtful analysis of the 
appropriateness of such a decision.423 But such an assessment should be based on 
                                                                                                                 
Ort, Martin Mazen Anbari, Wendy S. Lader & William Scott Biel eds., 1994) (arguing that 
child custody cases are not really about the child’s best interests but are about the interests of 
competing adults). 
 418. ROBERTS, supra note 69, at 121 (stating that when adoptive parents are able to 
intervene in fitness hearings, “[d]eciding the best interests of children in this setting might 
conjure up the question, Would this child be better off in the comfortable home of this white, 
well-to-do couple or struggling on public assistance with that neglectful Black mother?”).  
 419. AARON TERRAZAS, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES 5 (2011) (emphasis omitted); see also Brief of the 
Young Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights at the University of Chicago et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellant at 13, S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 
S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011). 
 420. See In re B.A., 705 N.W.2d 507, *5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished table 
decision) (finding the department’s argument that termination of parental rights was in the 
children’s best interests because they had never lived in Mexico insufficient because, 
previously, the children had also never lived in Iowa but adjusted to their new environment 
nonetheless). 
 421. Zug, supra note 58, at 1177. 
 422. Thronson, supra note 67, at 1211 (arguing that parents may be forced to make 
arguments in immigration court that their U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident children 
will face harm if their parents are deported in order to obtain immigration relief, or parents 
may legitimately be concerned about their child’s welfare but equally concerned about 
separation as a result of deportation). 
 423. Id. (“While other countries with different risks and opportunities provide 
challenging factual inquiries and may take much more research than domestic cases, the core 
of the inquiry and the process is the same. Just as the federal forum should not presume 
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the premise that a parent does act in her child’s best interests unless clear and 
convincing evidence suggests otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Undocumented parents are losing their parental rights. Some of these cases are 
legitimately about abuse, abandonment, and/or neglect. But many of these cases 
represent tensions around identity and how to cultivate that identity. Early child 
welfare practices removed immigrant children from their parents so that they could 
be raised in a more wholesome American setting. Similarly, Native American 
children were taken from their families and shuttered off to boarding schools for 
the purpose of assimilation into the Anglo culture. Recent termination of parental 
rights may not be so far removed from this history. Biases toward undocumented 
Latino immigrants affect assessments concerning their fitness as parents and their 
children’s best interests. To characterize these assessments as strictly legal inquiries 
ignores the underlying biases that taint such “objective” assessments. Ultimately, 
when the law is used to cultivate identity, the rights of those who are racially and/or 
culturally different from the dominant group are threatened.  
                                                                                                                 
capacity and authority to make custody determinations, the family court should not assume 
the role of asylum adjudicator. Major challenges will lie with advocates and participants in 
such proceedings to educate family courts to make reasoned decisions about the parent-child 
relationship when possible removal to other countries is involved.”). 
